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INTRODUCTION 
The international regulation of Geographical Indications (GIs) on 
products is one of the most contentious issues in the international 
negotiations among World Trade Organization (WTO) member states.  
The discussion revolves mainly around three issues: (i) the creation of a 
multilateral register for wines and spirits, (ii) the extension of the higher 
level of protection already existing for wines and spirits to other 
products, and (iii) the European Union (EU) initiative to regain the 
exclusive use of certain GI names.  The United States and the EU are 
the two main trading blocks that have set forth the opposing arguments 
that define the scope of this active debate.  The purpose of this paper is 
to provide a thorough analysis of the most significant arguments 
presented by WTO delegates and scholars in support of or against the 
aforementioned issues.  This project also represents an attempt to 
propose a policy recommendation for the solution of the conflict.  This 
recommendation takes into consideration, to the largest extent possible, 
the interests of all the parties involved. 
The regulation of GIs in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement was the result of a significant 
compromise among the WTO member states in which the political and 
economic interests of each of the members was taken into account.  The 
result was a hybrid discipline in which identifiers for similar products 
are treated in significantly different ways for no apparent logical reason.  
As part of this compromise, the WTO member states agreed in Article 
23 of the TRIPs Agreement to negotiate the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration for wines and spirits.  
Several proposals have been presented over the years on this subject, 
and they can be generalized into two main themes of argument: one 
theme proposed by the EU and the other by the United States.  The 
former proposes the creation of a multilateral register, whereas the 
latter supports the establishment of a voluntary database.  From reading 
the TRIPs Agreement and the available unrestricted documents 
prepared during the negotiations, it is clear that the WTO member 
states, in entering the agreement, settled on the establishment of some 
kind of multilateral register for wines and spirits, and therefore, the EU 
proposal on this subject is more in line with the signatories’ 
expectations.  This multilateral register should not be forgone unless a 
more efficient system that serves the TRIPs purposes can be identified. 
The extension of the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to products other than wines and spirits is a more delicate 
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Part I of this paper consists of a brief informational background of 
GIs with particular attention given to their historical development and 
to the most important international treaties addressing them, such as the 
TRIPs Agreement which is at the heart of this controversy.  Part II 
discusses the creation of a multilateral register for wines and spirits.  In 
order to facilitate a full understanding of the debate, the existing 
proposals are jointly summarized with a thorough analysis of the 
relevant portion of the TRIPs Agreement and the preceding 
negotiations.  This section also presents plausible alternative solutions 
for the implementation of the relevant portion of TRIPs.  Part III is 
dedicated to the analysis of the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to GIs on products other than wines and spirits.  Particular 
attention will be provided to the economic rationale for such an 
extension and its limits.  It also presents a complete overview of the 
most important scholarly arguments presented during the negotiations 
in support of or against the extension.  Finally, the chapter will explore 
issue.  Such an extension could severely affect competition in these new 
markets, and thus, could reduce consumer well-being.  Therefore, such 
an extension should be provided only in the presence of a significant 
economic justification, such as the producers’ abilities to meet the 
relatively recent consumer demand for varied and high-quality products.  
Given this fact, it is possible to conclude that such an extension would 
be warranted only when the extra protection under consideration is 
related to the production of varied and high-quality products, as in the 
case of wines and spirits.  In these regards, the concept of terroir 
provides significant guidance because it helps to identify those elements 
that, because of their strict connection with the territory, are unique and 
make the products in consideration unique as well.  Indeed, it is this 
intrinsic characteristic of the products in consideration that has to be 
preserved to meet the consumer demand for variety and quality. 
The EU initiative of reclaiming the exclusive use of certain GIs has 
no basis other than a retaliatory response for the deadlock of the 
negotiations over GIs that preceded the 2003 Cancun meeting.  Indeed, 
the presence of pre-existing rights to these terms and the fact that many 
of these geographic terms are generic in other WTO member states 
cannot be overcome by “historical arguments” that define the use of 
certain GIs by producers that are not located in the specific 
geographical area as a form of usurpation.  Therefore, no extension 
should be granted for the identifiers included in the EU list because no 
legal or economic justification can be identified to support a different 
conclusion. 
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why wines and spirits deserve a higher level of protection and will 
propose an empirical extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement 
only to those products that are similar to the products already included 
in the scope of Article 23.  In conclusion, Part IV will briefly discuss the 
EU initiative to reclaim the exclusive use of certain GIs and will explain 
why such an initiative should be rejected. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, DEFINITION, AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION 
GIs “were the earliest types of trademark.”1  Indeed, GIs have been 
part of product identity through history.  Even at the very beginning of 
wine production in Italy, for example, indications of origin were applied 
to containers as a means of classification.  Those efforts to protect the 
product’s identity shared the same basic motivations of modern day 
efforts to provide legal recognition to GIs: economic and consumer 
protection.2  In other words, protection of GIs tends to support “the 
creation of a distinctive product identifier and the assurance to the 
consumer of the authenticity of products bearing that identifier.”3
A.  Historical Background 
As international trade started to develop during the eighteenth 
century, it became clear that, because of their particular qualities, some 
products from a specific region had a much higher success rate on the 
international market than others coming from a different region.4  This 
trend led merchants to apply marks, which indicated the place of origin 
of the products, to the products themselves.5  “These brands were 
tantamount to a warranty of the quality of these goods,”6 and local 
1. Michael Blakeney, Proposal for the International Regulation of Geographical 
Indications, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 629 (2001). 
2. Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas?  Clarifying the Use of Geographical References on 
American Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1881, 1885 (2001). 
3. Id. 
4. See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 629 (“The superior quality resulted either from 
natural geographical advantages, such as climate and geology (e.g. Seville oranges, Kentish 
hops, Burgundy wine), recipes and food processing techniques local to a region (e.g. Kyoto 
bean cakes, Malmesbury mead, Frankfurter sausages) or indigenous manufacturing skills (e.g. 
Toledo steel, Delft ceramic ware, Korean celadon ware).”). 
5. Sometimes these brands were also accompanied by depictions of local animals, 
landmarks, buildings, heraldic signs or well-known local personalities.  Some examples are:  
Panda for beer, Mount Fuji for sake, Pisa’s tower for silk, fleur de lys for butter, Napoleon for 
brandy, and Mozart for chocolate.  Id. 
6. Id. 
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authorities started to provide protection for the commercial reputation 
of these products by passing laws aimed to prevent their adulteration. 
Even though a modern system of private trademarks emerged in 
Britain as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, its development 
did not cause, particularly in Europe, the disappearance of GIs.7  To the 
contrary, GIs continued to be associated with those traditional products 
for which they were initially created.  The continuous success of those 
traditional and high-quality products has allowed the survival of GIs 
until today.  Ultimately, large-scale industrial production developed 
much more in the United States than in Europe where well-established 
traditional methods of production resisted the aforementioned 
Industrial Revolution in many areas. 8  As a consequence, a system of 
privately owned trademarks that could allow individual producers to be 
identified as the exclusive source of their goods came to be of extreme 
importance, compared to other identification forms, in what has become 
the highly-competitive U.S. market. 
Hence, the origin of today’s international conflict regarding the 
regulation of GIs can be traced, at least partly, to the different methods 
of production, the development of the markets, and the underlying 
economic, historical and social background in the “old world” versus the 
“new world.” 
B.  Definition 
GIs are generic descriptions that can be used by all the producers in 
a particular geographic location for particular goods which are produced 
in that region.  Most commonly, GIs are place names (in some countries 
they are also words associated with that place) or signs that are used on 
goods with a specific geographical origin.  More specifically: 
 
[T]he term “geographical indication” encompasses both 
“indications of source” and “appellations of origin.”  
“Indications of source” is commonly understood to mean a word 
or other symbol that indicates that a product originates in a 
specific geographic region.  “Appellation of origin” refers to a 
word or symbol that indicates both that the product originates 
7. Id. at 630. 
8. Several reasons can be identified for such a “resistance” to the Industrial Revolution 
in some areas of the old continent.  Such reasons range from the particular social and cultural 
context in Europe to the development of the local markets.  A full analysis of them, although 
of extreme importance, goes far beyond the purpose of this paper. 
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from a specific geographic region and that it possesses the 
qualities or characteristics for which the place is known.9
 
GIs are, therefore, used to identify a wide variety of products, such 
as Tequila, Scotch, Grappa, Gorgonzola, Parmigiano Reggiano, and 
Idaho potatoes and onions, with particular characteristics because they 
come from specific places.  These products are protected in accordance 
with national laws via a wide variety of legal instruments including 
specific GI laws, trademark law, consumer protection law, and common 
law. 
In general terms, the most important characteristic of GIs protected 
by a sui generis law as compared to those that are protected by 
trademark law is the lack of private ownership10 that makes it possible 
for all the producers of a particular region to use and enjoy the right to 
protect GIs against misappropriation.11  This element, coupled with the 
required essential relationship between the user and the geographic 
region, causes GIs to not be freely transferable or licensable to other 
producers outside the specific region.  Finally, in order to benefit from 
this form of identifier, GIs normally require compliance by producers to 
specific quality standards of production.12
9. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM O. HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLMUTTER, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 315 (2001).  It is worth 
mentioning that, “[b]ecause of the diverse ways in which the protection of [GIs] has evolved 
under national laws, there is no generally accepted terminology,” and that therefore, the 
aforementioned expressions (“indication of source,” “appellation of origin,” and the 
“geographical indications” itself) represent the most conventional definitions which can be 
found in the literature.  See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 630.  Also, in April 2001, the WTO 
Secretariat adopted in this regards the term “indications of geographical origin.”  Id. at 631. 
10. As mentioned above, GIs pertain to all the products of a particular geographical 
location.  See supra Part I.B.  It is also useful to mention here that in those systems in which 
geographic marks are regulated by trademarks instead of a sui generis GIs law, these kinds of 
marks receive significant protection from certification marks whose ownership does not vest 
in the producers, but in a private third-party.  Indeed, the main difference between 
certification marks and GIs in this regard is given by the different ownership, which in the 
first case vests in a private subject whereas in the second case pertains to all the producers 
located in a certain area. 
11. However, in general, GIs are monitored and protected by the producer association 
of the particular region. 
12. The reason for this requirement is related to the goodwill conveyed by the GIs and 
its lack of private ownership.  Indeed, in order to protect this goodwill, consistency in the 
level of quality of the relative products is required, and thus, producers associations normally 
create standards of production that must be respected by all the local producers in order to 
benefit from the use of the specific GI.  See, e.g., the requirements for production of Chianti 
Classico DOCG and Olio Extravergine d’Oliva “Riviera Ligure – Riviera dei Fiori “ DOP 
(Table 1) infra at p. 56. 
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C.  The International Regulation of GIs 
While a number of attempts to institute the international protection 
of GIs have been made, many interested producers and observers are 
still awaiting a break-through.  The most notable treaties addressing this 
issue are the Paris Convention of 1883,13 the Madrid Agreement of 
1891,14 and the Lisbon Agreement of 1958,15 as well as a number of 
bilateral agreements.16  The basic concepts developed under these 
agreements have been incorporated into the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) of 1994, which became effective on January 1, 
1995.17
More specifically, the Paris Convention was the first multilateral 
agreement to prohibit the use of false GIs.18  Subsequently, in response 
to a request presented by a number of nations to provide a more 
comprehensive regulation, the Madrid agreement expanded the scope 
of protection by also including a prohibition against the use of 
misleading indications.19  Yet, these provisions failed to gain the support 
of important trading nations, such as the United States, Germany and 
Italy.20  The Lisbon Agreement, on the other hand, succeeded in 
“establish[ing] an international system of registration and protection of 
appellations of origin,” but it was only signed by a few nations.21  The 
13. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as 
last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
14. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 
1891, as revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ 
legal_texts/trtdocs_wo015.html [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]. 
15. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their 
International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as last revised Jan. 1, 1994, 923 U.N.T.S. 205,  
available at http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/legal_texts/lisbon_agreement.htm [hereinafter 
Lisbon Agreement]. 
16. See e.g., Council Decision 94/184, EU-Australia Agreement on Trade in Wine, 1994 
O.J. (L 86) 1; Agreement Between the European Community and Canada on Trade in Wines 
and Spirit Drinks, 2004 O.J. (L 35) 3; Agreement Between the European Community and the 
Republic of South Africa on Trade in Spirits, 2002 O.J. (L 28) 113;  Agreement Between the 
European Community and the Republic of South Africa on Trade in Wine, 2002 O.J. (L 28) 4. 
17. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
18. Blakeney, supra note 1 at 637. 
19. Id. at 638. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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TRIPs Agreement is the first such agreement to combine the broad 
support of important trading nations and a more significant 
international regulation of GIs. 
The TRIPs Agreement is binding upon all the member states of the 
WTO and thereby includes almost all the relevant markets in the 
world.22  It is certainly one of the most, if not the most, important 
international agreements on intellectual property protection, and GIs 
have particularly benefited from its enactment.  In fact, prior to the 
enactment of TRIPs, it was not possible to talk about a comprehensive 
global system of protection for GIs.  Both the Paris Convention and the 
Madrid Agreement covered only a small portion of the subject, and the 
Lisbon Agreement, although broader in its scope, suffered from limited 
membership, which also hobbled the relevant bilateral agreements.  
TRIPs, on the other hand, established a worldwide minimum standard 
of protection for GIs. 
The following articles define the protection required under the 
TRIPs Agreement: 
 
22. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art.1. 
 
 206  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [12:2 
 
 
• Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement23 covers all products 
for which a relationship between quality, reputation24 or 
other characteristics and geographical origin can be 
shown, and establishes a standard level of protection 
according to which GIs have to be protected in order to 
avoid misleading the public and to prevent unfair 
competition.25 
 
23. Id. art. 22. 
Protection of Geographical Indications 
1.  Geographical indications are, for the purposes of this Agreement, 
indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or 
a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. 
2.  In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal 
means for interested parties to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that 
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical 
area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the 
public as to the geographical origin of the good; 
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the 
meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967). 
3.  A Member shall, ex officio if its legislation so permits or at the request of an 
interested party, refuse or invalidate the registration of a trademark which 
contains or consists of a geographical indication with respect to goods not 
originating in the territory indicated, if use of the indication in the trademark 
for such goods in that Member is of such a nature as to mislead the public as to 
the true place of origin. 
4.  The protection under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be applicable against a 
geographical indication which, although literally true as to the territory, region 
or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represents to the public that the 
goods originate in another territory. 
Id. 
24. It should be noted that because Article 22 provides protection for goods that derive 
only their reputation from a particular location and not necessarily also their qualities, the 
TRIPs Agreement expands the scope of protection that was established in the Lisbon 
Agreement, and includes “indication of origin” together with “appellation of origin.”  See 
supra Part I.B. 
25. The concept of unfair competition relevant in this context is defined by Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention. 
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• Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement26 provides a higher 
level of protection for GIs for wines and spirits compared 
to the standard established for other products by Article 
22 of the TRIPs Agreement.27  Therefore, subject to a 
number of exceptions,28 GIs for wines and spirits have to 
be protected even if misuse would not cause the public to 
be misled.  Also, Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement 
provides stipulations for homonymous GIs29 on products 
sold in the same markets.  In this case, the rule allows for 
co-existence so long as some kind of specification is 
included to help the consumer distinguish the 
homonymous marks.  Finally, Article 23(4) of the TRIPs 
Agreement prescribes that WTO member states should 
undertake negotiations to create a multilateral system of 
26. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23. 
Additional Protection for Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits 
1.  Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent 
use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in 
the place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying 
spirits for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical 
indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or 
the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by 
expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the like. 
2.  The registration of a trademark for wines which contains or consists of a 
geographical indication identifying wines or for spirits which contains or 
consists of a geographical indication identifying spirits shall be refused or 
invalidated, ex officio if a Member's legislation so permits or at the request of 
an interested party, with respect to such wines or spirits not having this origin. 
3.  In the case of homonymous geographical indications for wines, protection 
shall be accorded to each indication, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of 
Article 22.  Each Member shall determine the practical conditions under which 
the homonymous indications in question will be differentiated from each other, 
taking into account the need to ensure equitable treatment of the producers 
concerned and that consumers are not misled. 
4.  In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines, 
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPs concerning the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members 
participating in the system. 
Id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. art. 24. 
29. Homonymous GIs are indications, which are spelled and pronounced in the same 
way, but refer to locations situated in different countries.  An example could be the term 
“Rioja” for wines coming from Spain or Argentina. See Blakeney, supra note 1, at 643. 
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notification and registration of GIs on wines. 30  A full 
discussion of this point will be the subject of the next 
Part.31 
• Article 24 of the TRIPs Agreement identifies a number 
of exceptions that limit the applicability of articles 22 and 
23. 32  In particular, the implementation of Articles 22 and 
30. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
31. See infra Part II. 
32. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24. 
International Negotiations; Exceptions 
1.  Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection 
of individual geographical indications under Article 23.  The provisions of 
paragraphs 4 through 8 below shall not be used by a Member to refuse to 
conduct negotiations or to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the 
context of such negotiations, Members shall be willing to consider the 
continued applicability of these provisions to individual geographical 
indications whose use was the subject of such negotiations. 
2.  The Council for TRIPs shall keep under review the application of the 
provisions of this Section; the first such review shall take place within two years 
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.  Any matter affecting the 
compliance with the obligations under these provisions may be drawn to the 
attention of the Council, which, at the request of a Member, shall consult with 
any Member or Members in respect of such matter in respect of which it has not 
been possible to find a satisfactory solution through bilateral or plurilateral 
consultations between the Members concerned.  The Council shall take such 
action as may be agreed to facilitate the operation and further the objectives of 
this Section. 
3.  In implementing this Section, a Member shall not diminish the protection of 
geographical indications that existed in that Member immediately prior to the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
4.  Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent continued and 
similar use of a particular geographical indication of another Member 
identifying wines or spirits in connection with goods or services by any of its 
nationals or domiciliaries who have used that geographical indication in a 
continuous manner with regard to the same or related goods or services in the 
territory of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding 15 April 1994 
or (b) in good faith preceding that date. 
5.  Where a trademark has been applied for or registered in good faith, or 
where rights to a trademark have been acquired through use in good faith 
either: 
(a) before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as 
defined in Part VI; or 
(b) before the geographical indication is protected in its country of origin; 
measures adopted to implement this Section shall not prejudice eligibility 
for or the validity of the registration of a trademark, or the right to use a 
trademark, on the basis that such a trademark is identical with, or similar 
to, a geographical indication. 
6.  Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to apply its provisions in 
 2008]   REGULATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION  209 
 
 
23 “shall not prejudice eligibility for or the validity of the 
registration of a trademark, or the right to use a 
trademark, on the basis that such a trademark is identical 
with or similar to,” an existing GI, if the trademark has 
been acquired in good faith either: 1) before the date of 
application of these provisions in the member state, or 2) 
before the GI is protected in its country of origin.33 
 
The following Parts will provide a full description of the main issues 
surrounding the scope and applicability of the aforementioned articles 
together with the relevant policy discussion. 
II.  THE MULTILATERAL REGISTER FOR WINES AND SPIRITS 
The international regulation of GIs on products was one of the most 
contentious TRIPs related issues at the international negotiations of the 
World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico.34  
respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to goods 
or services for which the relevant indication is identical with the term 
customary in common language as the common name for such goods or services 
in the territory of that Member.  Nothing in this Section shall require a Member 
to apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other 
Member with respect to products of the vine for which the relevant indication is 
identical with the customary name of a grape variety existing in the territory of 
that Member as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
7.  A Member may provide that any request made under this Section in 
connection with the use or registration of a trademark must be presented within 
five years after the adverse use of the protected indication has become 
generally known in that Member or after the date of registration of the 
trademark in that Member provided that the trademark has been published by 
that date, if such date is earlier than the date on which the adverse use became 
generally known in that Member, provided that the geographical indication is 
not used or registered in bad faith. 
8.  The provisions of this Section shall in no way prejudice the right of any 
person to use, in the course of trade, that person's name or the name of that 
person’s predecessor in business, except where such name is used in such a 
manner as to mislead the public. 
9.  There shall be no obligation under this Agreement to protect geographical 
indications which are not or cease to be protected in the country of origin, or 
which have fallen into disuse in that country. 
Id. 
33. Id. 
34. The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancun from September 10-14, 
2003.  More information about the meeting is available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto 
_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Cancun 
Conference]. 
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The November 2001 Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference 
in Doha provided the mandate for negotiations on a range of subjects, 
including two TRIPs issues. 35  Among these issues was the protection of 
GIs, whose debate played “a politically and ideologically divisive role in 
the furtherance of TRIPs’ goals to protect intellectual property and 
global economic interests” and to promote global trade. 36
The discussion, which evolved as a component of the larger debate 
on global agricultural policy, mainly revolves around three points of 
contention: (i) the creation of a multilateral register for wines and 
spirits, (ii) the extension of the higher level of protection of Article 23 of 
the TRIPs Agreement to products other than wines and spirits and (iii) 
the EU initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain geographical 
indication names.37
A.  Background and Proposals 
1.  Background 
The negotiations regarding the creation of a multilateral register for 
wines and spirits began in July 1997 following the enactment of Article 
23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement and continued until the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, which included a mandate for 
additional negotiations about the protection of GIs in its Declaration.38  
Since November 2001 some progress was made, but on September 14, 
2003, due to the objective impossibility of reaching an agreement on this 
and several other issues covered by the meeting, the Cancun Ministerial 
collapsed. 39  The talks, however, never really ended as the delegates 
have continued to negotiate back in Geneva, looking for solutions that 
could finally bring them to a binding agreement before the Hong Kong 
Ministerial meeting of December 2005.40
35. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/ [hereinafter Doha 
Ministerial Declaration]. 
36. Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag?  The Battle Between the United 
States and the European Union Over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 107, 110 (2001). 
37. Id. at 125-26. 
38. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35. 
39. It should be noted, however, that this result certainly was not unexpected to the 
WTO delegates, particularly if we consider that none of the intermediate deadlines 
established for the negotiations in Doha had been met before Cancun.  See Cancun 
Conference, supra note 34. 
40. See Minutes of the General Council, WT/GC/M/87 (Oct. 4, 2004), available at 
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Unfortunately though, the Hong Kong Conference did not produce 
the desired results.  To the contrary, the six days of talks did very little 
to resolve the conflicts among the WTO member states.41  In late July, 
2006, the WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, announced the 
suspension of the Doha Round.42 Without much warning, the 
negotiations resumed in February 200743 and included informal talks 
within the TRIPs Council about GIs.44  To better understand the debate 
in question and the arguments that have been presented, a brief 
description of the most important proposals presented follows. 
2.  The Proposals for the Multilateral Register 
Two main sets of proposals on the creation of a multilateral register 
for wines and spirits have been submitted over the years, and they 
represent the two primary arguments in the negotiations. 45  The first 
line of arguments, known as the TRIPs-plus proposal,46 endorsed by the 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/GC/M87.doc. 
41. See, e.g., Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Terms of Trade: A Coalition of the Willing?, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2005, at A18; Scott Miller & Greg Hitt, Farm-Aid Pact Averts Failure in 
Global Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Dec.19, 2005, at A3; Guy De Jonquieres & Frances 
Williams, WTO Deal Fails to Heal Rifts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at 1. 
42. See, e.g., Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck & Greg Hitt, Talks for Global Trade Deal 
Collapse, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A3; Alan Beattie, Several Suspects in Frame for Doha 
Murder, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at 5. 
43. BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (Int’l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev.), 
Feb. 7, 2007, Doha Round Negotiations “Fully” Resume; Lamy Sees Favourable Conditions 
for Deal, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-02-07/story1.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2008). 
44. BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (Int’l Ctr. For Trade and Sustainable Dev.), 
Feb. 21, 2007, Brief TRIPs Council Gives Way to Informals, available at http://www.ictsd.org/ 
weekly/07-02-21/story1.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
45. The proposals here mentioned have been revised several times over the years and 
also have been joined to other proposals presented by other WTO countries.  Therefore, the 
present analysis is just a schematic summary of the relevant concepts. 
46. This proposal represents the final version of a number of prior attempts to provide 
a possible solution to the implementation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement.  Special 
Session of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from the European Communities: Geographical Indications, 
WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005).  In July 1999, the EU submitted for 
the first time a proposal on the issue of the creation of a multilateral register for wines and 
spirits.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from the European Communities and their Member States: Proposal for a Multilateral Register 
of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs 
Agreement, IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998).  This proposal was then revised in June 2000 to 
accommodate the considerations presented by the other WTO Member states on the 1999 
version.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from the European Communities and their Member States: Implementation of Article 23.4 of 
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European Community, proposes that the registration at the WTO level 
would establish a “presumption” (that can be challenged on certain 
grounds) that the GI is to be protected in all other countries.47
Under this proposal, each WTO Member state seeking international 
protection of its GIs would have to notify the WTO Secretariat.  Once 
all relevant notifications have been collected, the WTO Secretariat 
would publish and communicate them to other WTO Member states, 
which would have eighteen months to examine the publication and 
present related questions.  During that period the WTO Member states 
also have the right to challenge the other states’ GI registrations thereby 
undertaking bilateral negotiations to solve possible disputes.  The GI in 
question will not be officially registered until the settlement of such 
negotiations, and, in the event of a successful challenge, it will be 
permanently excluded from the system.48  Opposition to the registration 
the TRIPs Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification 
and Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/107/Rev. 1 (June 22, 2000).  Subsequently, 
Hungary further developed the EU proposal and submitted its own version in 2001.  Council 
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary: 
Opposition/Challenge Procedure in the Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of 
Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/234 (Dec. 11, 2000).  Then, the EU incorporated the 
modifications proposed by Hungary in its May 2001 version.  Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary: Incorporation of 
Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 into the Proposal by the European communities 
and Their Member States on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001).  Finally, the version 
which is summarized here in its most significant aspects has been prepared and circulated in 
preparation of the Hong Kong Ministerial.  Special Session of the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from the European Communities: 
Geographical Indications, WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005).  The 
aforementioned documents are available at http://www.wto.org/ under the “Official 
Documents” link. 
47. See TRIPs:  GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/TRIPs_e/gi_background_e.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
48. Special Session of the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Communication from the European Communities: Geographical Indications, 
WT/GC/W/547/TN/C/W/26/TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005).  This provision is the result of a 
modification added by Hungary to the 2000 version of the EU proposal.  In that particular 
version, the EU suggested a system in which once the eighteen months elapsed all the 
notified GIs would be inserted in the multilateral register no matter if they were subject to 
challenges by some states.  The only legal effect of the opposition would be the consequent 
lack of protection of the challenged GI in the territory of the state that presented the 
opposition.  All the other states would still be under the obligation to provide the protection 
established by Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to the registered GIs no matter if 
challenged by other states.  As underscored by the proposal presented by Hungary, the need 
for certainty in the international trade and uniformity of treatment in all the WTO Member 
states would make this system quite ineffective, as the same GI would receive different levels 
of protection in different states with the possibilities of consequent distortions of trade (which 
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of a certain GI can only be brought by a WTO Member state on certain 
grounds, such as non-compliance with the definition of GIs in Article 22 
of the TRIPs Agreement or the fact that the GI is a generic name.49  
Thus far, the EU proposal is endorsed by “Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, 
Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and Venezuela.”50
The second main set of proposals known as the “joint paper,” was 
initially submitted by the United States and Japan in February 1999, 51 
revised by Canada and Chile in July 1999, 52 and further refined in 
September 200253 and April 200454 with the support of a number of 
other countries.  The final version submitted on April 2005 consists of a 
voluntary system in which each WTO Member state would initially 
communicate the list of GIs protected in its territory to the WTO, which 
would then register these GIs in a database maintained by the WTO 
is exactly what the TRIPs Agreement was aimed to avoid).  Hungary therefore proposed a 
system whose effects would be erga omnes and, as explained in the text, would determine the 
rejection of registration of all successfully challenged GIs.  Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Hungary: Incorporation of 
Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 into the Proposal by the European communities 
and Their Member States on the Establishment of a Multilateral System Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001). 
49. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(6). 
50. The support by these countries has been conditioned on a bona fide undertaking of 
the negotiations on the extension of the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to other products of their interest.  BERNARD O’CONNOR, THE LAW OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, 396 (Cameron May 2004). 
51. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Japan and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPs Agreement, IP/C/W/133 (Mar. 11, 1999). 
52. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Canada, Chile, Japan and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPs 
Agreement, IP/C/W/133/Rev.1 (July 26, 1999). 
53. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Namibia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Chinese Taipei, and the United States: Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPs Agreement, TN/IP/W/5 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
54. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, New Zealand and the United 
States: Joint Proposal for a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of 
Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits, TN/IP/W/9 (Apr. 13, 2004) 
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itself. 55  In turn, the participating governments would have to consult 
the database when making GI protection decisions in accordance with 
their national law, whereas non-participating members would be 
encouraged, but not obliged, to consult the database.56  Given that there 
are no legal repercussions connected to the insertion of a GI in the 
proposed database, which is merely a source of information for 
participating countries, no opposition procedure has been included in 
the “joint paper” proposal.  This system is supported by Argentina, 
Australia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, and Chinese Taipei.57
Both proposals suffer from major weaknesses and, in an attempt to 
overcome them, Hong Kong and the International Trademark 
Association (INTA) submitted an additional proposal and a position 
paper in April 2003.  Their proposals represent a middle ground 
between the two major trading blocks described above.  The Hong 
Kong proposal brings the protection of GIs back to the national courts 
of WTO member states. 58  Hong Kong proposes a registration system at 
the WTO level in which member states may communicate their 
respective GIs.  Notifications will only be examined on formal grounds 
at the WTO level and entry into the Register will create prima facie 
evidence of ownership, conformity to the definition included in Article 
22 of the TRIPs Agreement, and existence of the protection of the 
specific GI in the country of origin.59  This presumption may then be 
overcome in proceedings before national courts, tribunals, or 
administrative bodies whose decisions would be based on domestic law, 
and thus, would only have territorial effects. 
55. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Submission by 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei and the United States:  Proposed Draft TRIPs Council 
Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of 
Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits, p. 3, TN/IP/W/10 (Apr. 1, 2005). 
56. Id. 
57. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 397; see also Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Communication by Paraguay:  Addendum to Proposed Draft 
TRIPs Council Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wine and Spirits,  p. 1, TN/IP/W/10/Add.1 (Nov. 
18, 2005). 
58. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication 
from Hong Kong, China:  Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical 
Indications Under Article 23.4 of the TRIPs Agreement, pp. 6, 7, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003). 
59. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(9). 
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Similarly, INTA’s  position paper recommends a system of 
intellectual property rights protection that includes a 
notification/registration system based on the existence at the national 
level of application/registration and refusal/opposition procedures.  The 
national courts would examine each registration while particularly 
taking into account the existence of prior rights.  The final 
communication of successfully registered GIs at the domestic level to 
other WTO Member states would be made through an international 
body created by the WTO for this purpose.60
B.  The TRIPs Agreement 
WTO Member states are divided on the issue of the creation of a 
multilateral register for wines and spirits.  A number of states, 
particularly developing countries, support the EU proposal and have 
expressed to the TRIPs Council a desire that the registration system and 
the higher level of protection provide by Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement should be extended to many other products.61  The other 
side of the debate has been presented by the United States, Australia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Argentina, Canada, Chile, and others.  
These countries believe that the system of registration proposed by the 
EU will be expensive62 and that there is no evidence that the actual level 
of protection provided by Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement does not 
confer the benefit that the other countries expect to achieve through a 
more stringent protection of GIs.63
In order to increase the level of understanding of the international 
debate on this issue, it is necessary to refer to the TRIPs Agreement 
itself and to provide an analysis of its relevant portions as well as a brief 
overview of the negotiations that led to its enactment.  This will 
elucidate both what the WTO Member states agreed upon by entering 
the TRIPs Agreement and the way in which such an agreement came 
60. See International Trademark Association, Establishment of a Multilateral System of 
Notification and the Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Pursuant to 
TRIPs Article 23(4), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/inta_e.doc. 
61. Felix Addor & Alexandra Grazioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wine and 
Spirits.  A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO/TRIPs 
Agreement, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 865, 866 (2002). 
62. Id. 
63. Steven A. Bowers, Location, Location, Location:  The Case Against Extending 
Geographical Indication Protection Under the TRIPs Agreement, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 129, 154 
(2003). 
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about, allowing the gathering of useful information on how the present 
controversy should be addressed. 
1.  The Negotiations on the Protection of GIs before the TRIPs 
Agreement 
As with many other issues subject to international agreements, the 
regulation of GIs in TRIPs was the result of a compromise among 
conflicting economic, political, and legal interests.  Nevertheless, what 
can be considered unique to this particular “compromise,” as compared 
to the one reached over other forms of Intellectual Property (IP) in the 
TRIPs Agreement, is the size of the gap that the different negotiating 
countries had to fill in order to agree to the present regime of 
international regulation of GIs.  Indeed, many countries at the 
beginning of the negotiations, which started with general discussions 
about the objectives to be reached and principles of international law to 
be applied,64 did not have a clear understanding of the nature, specific 
characteristics, and relevance of GIs and, quite openly, questioned 
whether it was “appropriate to deal with this particular form of IP in the 
Negotiating Group.”65  In their opinion, there were no trade-related 
aspects connected with them or, at least, none that could not be resolved 
through the international regulation of trademarks. 66
64. This initial stage, which started in April 1987, was then followed by the submission 
of proposals by the different delegations, both on specific issues and on more general 
subjects, which constituted the basis for the subsequent discussions made by the Negotiating 
Group in 1988 and 1989.  The final draft agreement of 1991 was the result of such discussions 
and of the additional proposals submitted in 1990.  Minutes of the Negotiating Group on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods 
(“TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes”), MTN.GNG/NG11/1. 
65. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/9 (Oct. 13, 1988). 
66. In particular the delegation from Japan at this early stage of the negotiations 
expressed concerns about this issue and explained that its proposal did not include GIs, as 
this form of IP was still under study by its government.  It is important to keep in mind in 
these regards that the negotiations leading to the TRIPs Agreement developed within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework (and in particular within the 
Uruguay Round which was launched at Punta del Este in 1986) as a measure to eliminate 
trade distortion caused by the excessive, insufficient, or absence of protection of IP.  Indeed, 
as made clear by the Chairman (Ambassador Lars E.R. Anell from Sweden) in the March 25, 
1987 meeting, 
the protection of [IPR], including the way in which such protection was accorded 
and enforced, was an issue of significant and growing importance in international 
trade and economic relations.  International trade in goods increasingly involved the 
international exchange of technologies, creative activity and other subjects of [IPR].  
Some of [the] participants stressed the importance they attached to satisfactory 
results in this area, which were necessary in order to achieve an acceptable overall 
balance of results of the Uruguay Round. 
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On the other side of the spectrum were other countries, such as the 
EU and Switzerland, for which the protection of GIs was of extreme 
significance given the long-term establishment of GIs in their economies 
and legal tradition.  They underscored the importance of this particular 
form of IP for their governments and noted on more than one occasion 
that they “could not see the logic in accepting that GATT could deal 
with some substantive standards [of IP] . . . and, at the same time, 
claiming that other intellectual property rights could not be discussed.”67  
Indeed, according to them, “geographical indications were only one 
category among a number of types of intellectual property rights.”68
In between these two positions were those countries, such as 
Australia, Chile, and the United States, which although familiar with 
GIs, had a different legal tradition.  These countries provided protection 
for these geographic terms through trademark law, unfair competition 
and certification marks and not through a sui generis GI law.  Many of 
them had significant economic interests in these kinds of identifiers that, 
in their territory, consisted either of trademarks or generic terms, and 
thus considered the position held by the EU and Switzerland to be 
overreaching. 69  Indeed, these countries’ main objection to the EU 
proposal was the issue of how to deal with generic terms and trademarks 
incorporating geographic terms originating from other countries.70
These concerns were made clear by Australia in 1989 when one of its 
representatives, while comparing the EU and Australian proposals, said 
that “his delegation supported the protection of [GIs] including 
appellations of origin and could agree widely with the proposal of the 
TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr. 10, 1987).  Nevertheless, some 
other participants, particularly from the developing countries, pointed out that the goal of the 
negotiations was not to provide a substantive international regulation of IP (which was 
instead an issue on which at that time WIPO was working) that could harmonize the domestic 
law of the different WTO Member states, but only to agree upon a uniform solution to those 
issues that indeed had an impact on the international trade. In other words, it was clear since 
the beginning that the TRIPs Agreement had to deal only with those negative effects on trade 
that resulted from “anomalous” protection of IPR.  See Meeting of March 25, 1987, TRIPs 
Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr. 10, 1987);  TRIPs Negotiating Group 
Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/8 (Aug. 29, 1988).  Notwithstanding this initial objective, the 
negotiations had the result to provide the world’s most compressive and substantive 
international agreement on IPR. 
67. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/9 (Oct. 13, 1988). 
68. Id. 
69. This was particularly true for wine producing countries, such as Australia and Chile 
whose economic interest in specific GIs was equal to one of their European counterparts.  
TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989). 
70. Id. 
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Communities; the differences between his country [of origin] and the 
Community on this matter [were] essentially in regard to names that 
had become truly generic.”71  Indeed, according to him “many of the 
terms in question no longer reflected a geographical indication but had 
become associated with a general set of characteristics that pertained to 
a particular product.”72  Finally, he added that, “[a]s long as there was 
no intention, or effect, of deceiving the consumer, his delegation did not 
consider it necessary to protect names that had become truly generic.”73  
This position was also shared by the United States, whose 
representative shortly thereafter pointed out that “his country . . . 
recogni[z]ed . . . that over time terms would become so widely used as to 
become generic”74 and that therefore there were concerns in his 
delegation about the establishment in the TRIPs Agreement of a level 
of protection for GIs that was too high. 
The EU representative on the other hand “emphasi[z]ed the major 
trade distortions and impediments that were arising in his view because 
of widespread [misuse] of geographical indications, in particular . . . of 
names of geographical areas located on European territory which 
represented products specific to the natural and/or human environment 
in which they were elaborated.”75  He felt that “a considerable number 
of other countries, both developed and developing, had interests in this 
matter.  The products affected were often processed agricultural 
products.”76  He also hoped that “countries which stood to benefit from 
being able to exploit more fully a comparative advantage in agriculture 
as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations . . . would recogni[z]e the 
legitimacy of the Community’s desire to benefit fully from its own 
comparative advantage, which [consisted] particularly in the 
accumulation of know-how, experience and in its specific conditions of 
soil and climate.”77  Finally, he pointed out that “[t]he essence of what 
the Community was seeking was adequate protection against unfair use 
by third parties of the results of the work, investment and goodwill 
generated by its people[].”78
71. Id. 
72. Id. at ¶ 26. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at ¶ 24. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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The positions of the different delegations over the regulation of GIs 
continued to be substantially irreconcilable during 1988 and 1989 and 
became even more problematic towards the beginning of 1990.79  
Indeed, as the deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations 
approached, the tension in the negotiations increased and a number of 
new legal texts were submitted.  The first was that of the EU,80 which 
was introduced at the meeting of April 1990 by a representative of its 
delegation, which underscored that “[t]he Community had decided to 
reiterate its previously tabled proposal on this matter, in the hope that 
other participants would make constructive attempts to address the 
trade problems in this area.”81  He also stressed “the unacceptable 
nature of the present situation in certain jurisdictions, mainly created by 
the absence of adequate protection of appellations of origin in a few 
countries to the advantage of a relatively small number of producers, 
and to the detriment of the legitimate producers of such appellations in 
the Community or in other wine producing countries.”82
It became clear at that point that no agreement could have been 
reached with the EU without the inclusion in the TRIPs Agreement of 
some level of protection for GIs that could have been considered 
satisfactory from the Community perspective. 83  The EU proposal was 
79. The agreement was supposed to be reached by the autumn of 1990, but soon it 
became clear that it was very unlikely this goal was going to be met as expressly underscored 
by the Chairman of the negotiations when in August 1990 he commented upon the 
consultations and said: 
The consultations had been positive and held in a very constructive atmosphere . . . 
[but they] had not served to narrow significantly the gap on points where there were 
differences of substance.  The number of such points, their complexity and the 
extent of the gap between participants in respect of many of them were such that the 
task of reaching an agreement in the Autumn remained a formidable one. 
TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/23 (Aug. 22, 1990). 
80. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the European Communities:  
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/ 
W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990). 
81. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/20 (Apr. 24, 1990). 
82. Id. 
83. Indeed such an agreement was highly desired by more than one country.  In 
particular, the United States was suffering heavy losses from the absence of adequate 
protection of IPR abroad. 
The industries in such sectors as computer software and microelectronics, 
entertainment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, had become 
concerned about the loss of commercial opportunities abroad.  In 1987 a survey by 
the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) confirmed, on the basis of 
public hearing held and questionnaires administered, that the United States firms 
were loosing [sic] some 50 billion dollars, owing to lack of protection abroad of 
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therefore “followed by a series of similar drafts of complete texts of 
TRIPs Agreement, submitted in May 1990 by the United States,84 
Switzerland,85 and Japan,86 all of which ‘borrowed substantially from the 
Community’s text.’”87  Also in May 1990, for the first time a group of 
developing countries submitted a proposal.88  All the aforementioned 
drafts included provisions that addressed GIs that, to use the words of 
the EU representative, “still fell short of the Community’s ambitions,” 
but without doubt represented progress towards a possible agreement. 89
Subsequently the Chairman of the negotiations produced a 
composite text, that summarized the relevant points and alternatives of 
the proposals mentioned above. 90  This document represented the basis 
on which the negotiations, which anticipated the Brussels meeting of 
December 1990, took place.  The Brussels meeting produced tangible 
results and the Draft Final Act was issued by December 1991.91  “[T]he 
subsequent discussions did not yield many substantive provisions 
different from [the one included in the December 1991 draft],”92 which 
therefore is very close to the agreement adopted in Marrakesh in 1994. 
As for the specific regulation of GIs, it can be said that the final 
version of the TRIPs Agreement reflects the dynamics and struggles of 
Intellectual Property. 
A. O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement:  Origins and History of the 
Negotiations (2001), http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2001-07-30/Adede.pdf ¶¶ 3-4. 
84. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the United States:  Draft 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 
(May 11, 1990). 
85. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Switzerland:  Draft Amendment 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the Protection of Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/73 (May 14, 1990). 
86. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Japan:  Main Elements of a 
Legal Text for TRIPs, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/74 (May 15, 1990). 
87. Adede, supra note 83, ¶ 20. 
88. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 
(May 14, 1990). 
89. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/21 (June 22, 1990). 
90. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG:  Status of Work in the 
Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990). 
91. Adede, supra note 83, ¶ 25. 
92. Id. 
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the negotiations over this issue, as it consists of a hybrid discipline in 
which identifiers with similar characteristics for similar products are 
treated in substantially different ways with no logical justification 
supporting it.  Indeed, as mentioned in the previous Part, under the 
TRIPs Agreement, 93  GIs for wines and spirits enjoy a much higher 
level of protection than GIs for other potentially identical products.94  
The only plausible explanation for this result can be found in the 
political pressures exercised on this issue during the negotiations by the 
EU on one side and the resistance of the other countries adversely 
affected by a stringent GI regulation on the other. 
This result is even more apparent if the drafts of the agreement that 
were submitted during 1990 by the different delegations are compared.  
A progressive spectrum of levels of protection for this kind of identifier, 
that go from a very broad regime whose scope covers all types of 
products and provides protection for generic terms,95 to a very narrow 
regime in which GIs are protected only if their use misled the public, 
can be identified.  The compromise was reached somewhere in the 
middle of this spectrum, and GIs for wines and spirits have particularly 
benefited from it. 
Also, it can be noted that two significant provisions that were 
present in the EU’s draft96 disappeared from the final version of the 
agreement.  They referred to the issue of generic terms and provided, on 
one side, for WTO Member states to establish “[a]ppropriate measures . 
. . under national law . . . to prevent [GIs] from developing into a 
designation of generic character”97 and, on the other, that it was 
“understood that appellations of origin for products of the vine . . . 
[were] not . . . susceptible to develop into generic designations.”98  Many 
countries strongly opposed these provisions and questioned the 
significance of distinguishing wine from other products.99
93. See supra Part I.C. 
94. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 22-23. 
95. In particular, see the EU proposal under Protective Measures.  Negotiating Group 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods, Communication from the European Community:  Draft Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (emphasis added). 
99. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG:  Status of 
Work in the Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11W/76 (July 23, 1990); TRIPs Negotiating 
Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/27 (Nov. 14, 1990). 
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Finally, the initial EU proposal included under “Restricted Acts” 
that “any usurpation, imitation or evocation, even where the true origin 
of the product [was] indicated or the appellation or designation [was] 
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, 
‘style’, ‘imitation’ or the like.”100  In that context, this provision extended 
to all GIs no matter the kind of product to which they are associated, 
whereas in the TRIPs Agreement, a very similar rule is established in 
Article 23, but only for wines and spirits.101
Ultimately, it looks clear that the EU, in the last moments of the 
negotiations, had to give up some of its goals regarding the international 
protection of GIs in order to obtain the significant coverage enjoyed 
today by those GIs on products that probably are among the most 
important for the Community’s economy and for which the connection 
with the particular place of origin and their qualities is more evident: 
wines and spirits. 
2.  Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement 
As part of the compromise reached on the general regulation of 
GIs,102 a provision for undertaking negotiations in the TRIPs Council to 
establish a multilateral system of notification and registration for wine103 
was included in Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement.   
 
In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for 
wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPs 
100. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from the European Community:  
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG 
/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990). 
101. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23. 
102. See supra Part II.B.1. 
103. It is important to note that the Doha Declaration extended the negotiations on 
this point and included “spirits” (which are not part of Article 23(4) together with “wine” in 
the scope of the multilateral register).  In its relevant portion, the Doha Declaration says:  
“[w]ith a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPs) on the implementation of Art. 23.4, we 
agree to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and regulation of 
geographical indication for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference.”  Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35.  The main supporters of the 
inclusion of “spirits” in the Doha mandate for the present negotiations were the United 
States and Mexico on account of their Tequila and Bourbon production.  David Vivas-Eugui, 
Negotiations on Geographical Indications in the TRIPs Council and Their Effects on the WTO 
Agricultural Negotiations—Implications for Developing Countries and the Case of Venezuela, 
4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 703, 711 (2001). 
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concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines 
eligible for protection in those Members participating in the 
system.104
 
From a comparison of the final version of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs 
Agreement with the respective provisions included in the drafts 
submitted by the different WTO Member states in 1990, several 
significant elements can be identified that can facilitate the 
understanding of what is required by TRIPs on this issue.  In particular, 
the composite text submitted by the Chairman of the negotiations in 
July 1990,105 which, as mentioned above, represents a summary of the 
different positions of the WTO Member states right before the 
negotiations that brought the 1991 Draft Final Act, can be used to 
isolate few but very significant points.106  Indeed, under the section 
“International Register” the draft reports that: 
 
PARTIES agree to cooperate with a view to establish an 
international register for protected geographical indications, in 
order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications 
including appellations of origin.  In appropriate cases the use of 
documents certifying the right to use the relevant geographical 
indication should be provided for.107
 
Once again it is possible to conclude that until the very end of the 
negotiations the register was intended for all kind of GIs and not solely 
for those related to wines and spirits.  Therefore, this significant 
limitation introduced in the final version of the article had a high 
probability of being counterbalanced.  This idea is reinforced in the 
introduction of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement by the term 
“multilateral,” a term that was absent in all the drafts that preceded the 
final agreement. 108  In fact, the inclusion of such a term indicates a 
precise intent of the WTO Member states to provide for a register with 
those specific effects that are normally associated with the use of the 
104. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4) (emphasis added). 
105. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman’s Report to the GNG:  Status of Work in the 
Negotiating Group, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
108. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
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word “multilateral” in the WTO context. 109  Indeed, the “meaning of the 
term ‘multilateral’ can only be defined . . . by contrasting it with the 
world ‘plurilateral.’ In the context of the WTO, ‘plurilateral’ is 
understood as referring to a system in which . . . [the prescribed 
obligation and rights only bind signatory countries].  Conversely, 
‘multilateral’ systems are understood to be instruments by which all 
Members are bound.”110
This conclusion is supported once again by the derestricted 
documents of the TRIPs negotiations in which on more than one 
occasion the participants expressed their “will to elaborate a solution 
that would be applicable to all participants—a truly multilateral 
solution”111 or by underlining the need for the establishment of a 
multilateral process “in absence of [which] . . .  the alternative would be 
a situation where the subjective assessments of individual contracting 
parties come into conflict with each other . . . ,”112 have specifically 
intended something that required the involvement of all the WTO 
Member states and not just of those willing to participate.  Therefore, it 
can be said that by entering the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO Member 
States agreed to negotiate the establishment of a system of registration 
for wines and spirits in which the insertion of a GI creates the binding 
“effects” of having the registered identifier protected in all the WTO 
Members. 
Finally, further analyzing the remaining portion of Article 23(4) of 
the TRIPs Agreement, it should be noted that the required system must 
be a “voluntary” one.  This is because of the presence of the expression: 
“in those Members participating in the system.”113  This must nevertheless 
be interpreted in accordance with the “multilateral” provision of the 
previous part.  The consequence is that the TRIPs Agreement requires a 
system in which the WTO Member states are free to participate, while 
also being subject to the behavior of the other countries.  In other 
words, TRIPs calls for a system in which registering a GI guarantees it 
109. It is worth underlining once more that these “effects” were totally absent in the 
previous drafts as the expression “international register” could refer for example to a simple 
plurilateral system of registration which does not involve the production of binding effect in 
all the WTO member states but only in those who decide to participate in the system of 
registration. 
110. J.M. Cortes Martin, The WTO TRIPs Agreement – The Battle Between the Old and 
the New World Over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
287, 294 (2004). 
111. TRIPs Negotiating Group Minutes, MTN.GNG/NG11/8 (Aug. 29, 1988). 
112. Id. at 6. 
113. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
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the level of protection established by Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement in all the WTO Member states, no matter whether the 
country in which such protection is sought has decided to participate in 
the system by developing and registering their own GIs.114
From the previous discussion, it is therefore possible to conclude 
that the U.S. proposal for the implementation of Article 23(4) of the 
TRIPs Agreement cannot be accepted because it falls short of the 
specific requirement of the relevant provision of the treaty.  This is 
because it does not establish a system which, although voluntary in its 
participation, establishes the same legal “effects” in all the WTO 
member states. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the additional fact that Article 23(4) 
of the TRIPs Agreement, in defining the required system, uses the 
terms “notification and registration.”  This suggests that a system that 
simply requires notification, such as the system proposed by the United 
States, is not enough.  This is because the act of registering something in 
a registry implies more than the mere conveyance of information 
because it “puts the public ‘on notice’ that the registrant is asserting a 
claim.”115  Indeed, the “registration of information in a register is linked 
to the granting of rights,”116 whereas the insertion of the same 
information in a database does not necessarily have the same “force,” 
and thus, it can be concluded that the U.S. proposal on this matter is not 
acceptable. 
Conversely, the Hong Kong proposal should be rejected because it 
lets the national courts decide issues regarding the registration of GIs on 
wines and spirits in each specific case would expose those GIs to the 
great risk of a substantial disparity of treatment in different WTO 
member states.  This result does not appear to be consistent with the 
purpose “to facilitate117 the protection of geographical indications for 
wines [and spirits]”118 as well as the “multilateral” requirement discussed 
above as specified in Article 23(4). 
114. See id. 
115. See UNU-IAS Report, The Role of Registers and Database in the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge:  A Comparative Analysis, available at http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries 
/UNUIAS_TKRegistersReport.pdf, at 11 [hereinafter UNU-IAS Report]. 
116. It is important to underscore here that “[a]lthough the registration serves to 
secure the recognition of . . . relevant rights the register does not itself grant rights, but rather 
record such rights.”  Id. 
117. A uniform system of registration will reduce the level of uncertainty about GIs 
and thus will ultimately facilitate their protection.  See also infra Part II.C.1. 
118. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
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INTA’s proposal is also problematic because it relies on the 
subsistence at the national level of application/registration systems 
instead of providing for the establishment of some kind of uniform 
mechanism at the international level devoted to serve the specific 
purpose described in Article 23(4).119  Indeed, this solution cannot be 
considered an effective one, which is clear if the different consequences 
determined by the introduction of the system of registration are 
considered.  In particular, it is necessary to examine and distinguish the 
consequences that would occur in the event the registration is made at 
the international level (perhaps with a WTO office), or at the domestic 
level, where each state will have to adapt existing administrative 
systems.  For some states the second option might not represent a 
problem as they might already have an appropriate legal infrastructure 
that could easily be used for this purpose, but for some other states, it 
might require considerable efforts and resources to incorporate the new 
mechanism of registration.  Therefore, the registration system would 
ultimately produce different consequences in each of WTO member 
states.  Producers in certain countries would have easy access to 
registration and would register their GIs promptly and effectively, and 
other producers in other countries would have to wait substantially 
longer.  Eventually these producers could decide to “defect” and suffer 
the obvious consequent economic damages. 
It is therefore possible to conclude that the proposal presented by 
the EU, at least to the extent of the elements discussed above,120 appears 
119. See id. 
120. It is important to mention that after the issuance of the report of the WTO panel, 
See Panel Report, Complaint by the United States, European Communities – Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 
WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005), the EU proposal has been subject to strong criticism because 
of the substantial similarity between the opposition procedure of the EU GI Regulation, 
based on the ground of the “absence of protection in the country of origin,” and the 
correspondent procedure included in what was, at that time, the latest version of the EU 
proposal.  Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Communication from Hungary, Incorporation of Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/2344 
into the Proposal by the European Communities and Their Member States on the 
Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical 
Indications, WT/IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001).  As a consequence, on June 14, 2005, the EU 
presented a new version of its proposal for the establishment of the multilateral register in 
which the aforementioned ground for opposition has not been included.  Council Report, 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005).  To better 
understand the dynamic of this episode, a quick digression on the controversy about the EU 
GI regulation is useful.  In June 1999, the United States, joined by “Australia, Sri Lanka, New 
Zealand and Mexico,” requested WTO dispute consultations on the EU GI regulation 
2081/92 (subsequently amended by Regulation 692/2003).  Request for Consultation by the 
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to be the one that best fits the requirement of Article 23(4);121 therefore, 
the EU proposal should be preferred for its implementation. 
Generally, the TRIPs Agreement and the analysis of the 
negotiations made above can be interpreted to show that the WTO 
Member states are obligated to negotiate the establishment of some 
kind of register for wines and spirits whose operation would produce 
binding effects on all of them.  This result should not be changed unless 
it can be shown that a different system of implementation, such as the 
one proposed by the United States, is more efficient in achieving the 
aforementioned purpose of facilitating the protection of GIs for wines 
and spirits in all the WTO Member states.  This is because there are 
significant direct and indirect costs associated with the renegotiations of 
this provision that are particularly evident if one considers the 
disastrous results of the Cancun meeting and the negotiations that 
followed until today.122  Indeed, in this specific case, the risk of others 
United States, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS/74/1 (June 1, 1999).  The EU 
was on the other hand supported by “Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Turkey, Malta, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia and Taiwan” (Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Slovakia are now members of the EU).  O’Connor, supra note 50, at 147.  The 
United States challenged the EU GI Regulation primarily on the grounds related to the 
“reciprocity” provision of the EU regulation that allows the EU refusal to register GIs from 
third countries, which are WTO Member, unless the same protection as in the EU is offered.  
Id.  It was claimed that this provision is “inconsistent with national treatment and most 
favored nation obligation under both the TRIPs and the GATT agreement.”  Id.  The WTO 
panel found that the “reciprocity” provision included in Article 12(1) of the EU GI 
Regulation provides that non-EU-Member states must give guarantees identical or 
equivalent to those required to determine compliance to the required specification—for 
example, the description of the product, the definition of geographical area, the elements 
providing a link with the geographical environment and reference to the inspection structure] 
is "inconsistent with Article 3(1) of the TRIPs Agreement, which basically requires foreign 
and domestic products (in this case identifier on products) to be subject to the same 
treatment.  TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 3(1).  The Panel recommended that the EU 
bring the regulation into conformity with the TRIPs Agreement by for example amending the 
Regulation so as for those conditions not to apply to the producers for registration of GIs 
located in other WTO Members.  TRIPs Council, Special Session, Discussion of the 
Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Regulation of Geographical 
Indication for Wines and Spirits: Compilation of Issues and Points, TN/IP/W/7 (May 23, 
2003). 
121. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
122. It is not suggested that the result of the deadlock of the negotiations in Cancun 
was entirely caused by the lack of agreement on the creation of the multilateral register for 
wines and spirits.  However, it can certainly be said that the nature of the negotiations over 
GIs that preceded Cancun did not contribute to the creation of a favorable climate for 
negotiations on other subjects.  Indeed, another “hot” issue in the negotiation about GIs is 
represented by the fact that the EU is presently reclaiming the exclusive use of certain GIs 
even if they are generic terms or trademarks in other WTO countries.  See O’CONNOR, supra 
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being retaliated against in international negotiations is very high by 
those countries potentially adversely affected by a change of the 
required system.  The international regulation of GIs has been the result 
of a difficult process that required a tenuous balance of power and 
economic interests on the sides of all the interested countries.  In this 
context, the renegotiation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement 
could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the validity of the 
overall GI system that was established by the introduction of Articles 22 
to 24 of the TRIPs Agreement and not just as an alternative way of 
implementing it. 
C.  Final Considerations 
As described above, the required system for the implementation of 
Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement consists of a register whose 
operation has binding effects in all WTO Member states.  Also, the 
previous section covered that this conclusion should not be disregarded 
unless a more efficient system, which would justify a change in the 
agreement, could be identified.  It is therefore necessary to consider and 
compare the costs related to the proposed systems and the respective 
ability of the system to facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and 
spirits as explicated in Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement.123
1.  Brief Analysis of the Proposed Systems 
Determination of the costs required by the proposed systems is a 
very difficult task, mainly because of the substantial absence of reliable 
data that could provide a conclusive answer about which of them is the 
most expensive, either in the event of implementation at the 
international level, or at the domestic level in all the WTO Member 
States.  Therefore, in order to determine which system is most efficient, 
it is necessary to analyze the function that must be performed by the 
proposed system.  One way to perform this task is through the 
comparison of the proposed systems with similar situations in which 
either a register or a database has been adopted to achieve similar goals.  
note 50, at 57.  This EU initiative was presented for the first time during the agricultural 
negotiation and created great disappointment among some participants that considered the 
discussion of this issue inappropriate in that context, and asked to bring back to the 
negotiations on IP subjects the regulation of GIs.  See id.  This episode is indeed relevant for 
the purpose discussed here because it shows the deep interconnection that exists among the 
different subjects of the negotiations and the potential for the exercise of political pressure 
among different areas. 
123. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(4). 
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In this regard, the database proposed by the United States for the 
implementation of Article 23(4) of the TRIPs Agreement appears to be 
very similar to the one adopted at the domestic level by a number of 
developing countries, such as India and China, in order to improve the 
international protection of their traditional knowledge (TK). 
In order to inform patent officers around the world (particularly in 
the Western countries) of the existence of their “prior art,” several 
countries created “traditional knowledge databases (TKDs)124 to collect 
their innovation heritage.”125  These databases are “offered” to patent 
officers worldwide in the hope of improving their knowledge regarding 
claims of novelty by companies seeking a patent in a particular country.  
Unfortunately though, the risk of TKDs being disregarded is very high 
because, as mentioned above, they are only offered for consultation to 
the patent officers who are potentially free to ignore them.126  Indeed, 
several critiques have been made about the ability of TKDs to facilitate 
protection of TK, most of which refer to the fact that patent officers 
around the world do not feel obliged to consult any of the existing 
databases on this subject.  In particular, it has been noted that “those 
patent offices which have received training and are aware of the issue 
involved or have been blamed in the past for same wrong decisions are 
now sensitive to this problem.  However, this is just a handful of 
them.”127
124. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1357 (2004). “China offers a Traditional Chinese Medicine Patents 
Database”; India "has created a Traditional Knowledge Library; and the World Bank 
produced a database to collect African and other regional indigenous knowledge.  Id. at 1357-
58. 
125. Id. at 1357. 
126. Although it is true that no matter what the patent officers do in relation to TKDs, 
litigants will still be able to use the information included in these databases as evidence of 
“prior art.”  Id. at 1357.  It is therefore important to underscore that this result will be 
available only to those parties that can afford to undertake a patent litigation.  Indeed, the 
costs of this kind of litigation could represent a significant barrier particularly for the parties 
coming from developing countries. 
127. Email from Pravin Anand, Managing Partner of Anand Anand Advocates of New 
Delhi, to the author (Feb. 17, 2005, 13:15:45 PST) (on file with author).  In order to gather 
more information about the efficiency of TKDs for this article, Mr. Pravin Anand was 
contacted by email and then gave the reported opinion on the use of databases to protect TK.  
Mr. Anand is a specialist in the area of IP and has been affiliated with several associations 
relevant in this field.  He has been “Chairman of the IPR Promotion Advisory Committee 
(IPAC) set up by the Ministry of Information Technology . . . , Government of India; 
Member of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Protection of Rights of holders of indigenous 
knowledge; . . . Member of INTA, ITMA, IBA, AIPLA, CIB of ICC and the INTA Anti-
Counterfeiting & Enforcement Committee for 2004 – 2005.”  INTA, Panel of Neutrals, Bio of 
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On the other hand, the multilateral register for wines and spirits 
appears much more suitable to serve the purpose of facilitating the 
protection of GIs for wines and spirits because it is expected to increase 
uniformity in the international market.  Thus, the number of lawsuits 
are reduced.  Indeed, once a GI for wines and spirits has been 
successfully registered (that means that no challenges have been 
lodged), it will basically receive the same treatment in all the WTO 
Member states.  An administrative officer or judge will have to consult 
the register and find out if, in some other part of the world, there is any 
previous right holder.  However, no empirical studies or data are 
available at the moment on this issue and thus the inferences reported 
here cannot be considered conclusive unless supported by further 
investigations.  These investigations might include, for example, the 
analysis of the European cases in which the system of registration is 
much more developed than in many other countries. 
It also seems useful to report the results of a study conducted by the 
United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS)128 
on the role of register and database in the protection of TK,129 which 
does not provide a conclusive answer about the effectiveness of these 
systems but underlines that both these measures “alone do not provide 
a means for the effective protection of TK.  Rather they must be seen as 
one element or mechanism in a wider system of TK governance . . . .”130  
More significant for the purpose of the Article appears to be the 
additional conclusion of this study.  It reports that depending on their 
specific objectives, databases and registers may play a substantial role in 
Pravin Anand, Anand and Anand, http://www.inta.org/downloads/adr_AnandPravin.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
128. “UNU-IAS was established in 1996 as a research and training center . . . to 
undertake research and post postgraduate education on emerging issues of strategic 
importance for the United Nations and in its Member States.” UNU-IAS Report, supra note 
115, at 5. 
129. Id.  The UNU-IAS’ project consists of a comparative study of cases in which 
either a database or a register has been adopted to protect TK and has been conduced with “a 
view to identifying their effectiveness, possibilities and limitations.”  Id.  The goal was to 
produce a “more informed and productive debate in the international negotiations about the 
protection of [TK].” 
Seven case studies have been considered and divided in four categories:  [1-] indigenous 
registers and databases: database of Inuit of Nunavik in Canada [; 2-] institutional databases 
BioZulua database in Venezuela and the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library [TKDL] in 
India [;3-] NGO co-operative databases: database of Farmer’s Rights Information System 
(FRIS) and database of Honey Bee Network database, both in India [; 4-] state registers: 
holistic register in Panama and national and local registers of TK relating to biodiversity of 
Peru.  Id. at 8. 
130. Id. 
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achieving TK governance.  In particular, in the case of protection of TK, 
there can be two different approaches: 
 
• Defensive protection: consists in preventing the 
granting of patent over TK through the incorporation 
of TK into a database for the purpose of aiding patent 
authorities in search of prior art.  This approach 
facilitates “access to TK for the private sector, 
without increasing indigenous . . . peoples’ rights in 
any way over their knowledge.”131 
• Positive protection: consists in the legal recognition in 
favor of indigenous people of rights over TK.  One 
way to provide this kind of protection is the adoption 
of a register specific for this purpose.132 
 
In other words, “[d]atabases can play an important role in defensive 
protection of TK”133 whereas registers are more suitable for positive 
protection of TK.  Additionally, any decision about the adoption of one 
of these systems should be made with this consideration in mind.  It is 
therefore possible to conclude that the results of this study are 
applicable to the case of GIs.  Given what was established by Article 23 
of the TRIPs Agreement for wines and spirits,134  the adoption of a 
register should be preferred over the introduction of a database as a 
positive system of protection of GIs in which rights are recognized to 
GIs holders is established by the TRIPs Agreement. 
Nevertheless, as reported above, these considerations are not 
sufficient to reach a conclusive determination about the effectiveness of 
registers and databases to facilitate the international protection of GIs.  
Therefore, particularly considering the significant difficulties 
encountered by the WTO negotiators on this subject, they call for 
131. And thus produce the positive effect of enriching the public domain on which new 
inventions can be developed. It is worth emphasizing that the scope of the reported study is 
not to determine whether indigenous people are entitled to rights on their TK, but only to 
test the effectiveness of certain measures to achieve different goals.  Id. at 6. 
132. Of course, in this case, the register alone would not suffice and would have to be 
part of wider system of protection of TK.  The same is true if instead a “defensive protection” 
approach were adopted, as the creation of a database per se most probably would not be 
enough to protect TK, but will require also the establishment of some kind of more general 
system in which this informational tool produces the most efficient results.  Id. at 7-8. 
133. Id. at 38. 
134. Particularly Article 23(2) of the TRIPs Agreement, which provides that the 
rejection and invalidation of TM for wines which contains or consists of GIs at the request of 
an interested party (i.e. a GI owner).  TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 23(2). 
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further and deeper analysis that unfortunately goes far beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
III.  THE EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 23 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT TO 
GIS ON PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND SPIRITS 
The extension of the higher level of protection of Article 23 of the 
TRIPs Agreement to products other than wines and spirits has been a 
very controversial issue in the international negotiations for the 
protection of GIs.  It is therefore important to clarify that presently 
there is no clear understanding among the WTO member states as to 
whether a mandate exists under Doha to negotiate this subject.135  If one 
assumes that the delegates do indeed have sufficient authority to 
negotiate the extension of Article 23, we once again find the member 
states divided between the two main lines of arguments, split with the 
EU on one side and the United States on the other. 
Those advocating the extension of a higher level of protection see it 
as a means to better market their products.  Those opposing the 
extension argue, instead, that the existing (Article 22 of the TRIPs 
Agreement) level of protection for these products is adequate, and that 
providing enhanced protection would be too expensive.136  Also, an 
increasing number of developing countries, among them Latvia, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, India, Pakistan, Mauritius, Kenya, Sri 
Lanka, Egypt, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia and 
Nicaragua, have shown significant interest in the extension of Article 23 
135. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 35.  In particular, the relevant 
portion of the Doha declaration says:  “[w]e note that issues related the extension of the 
protection of geographical indications provided for in art. 23 to products other than wines and 
spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPs pursuant to §12 of this declaration.”  Id. § 
18.  Problems arose in regard to this mandate because some states questioned if indeed the 
aforementioned §12 could provide the required authority to undertake this specific 
negotiations More information on this point are available at http://www.wto.org/english/trat 
op_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm#protection. 
136. Once again no empirical evidences can be reported on this point. As on 
commentator noted: 
there is very little analysis available on the costs and benefits of geographical 
indications.  There is ample anecdotal evidence in Europe that land for the 
protection of geographically protected wines sells for several times the cost of 
similar land in the same area but outside the GI territory.  There are statistics that 
show that the turnover in products sold using geographical indications exceeds [$10 
billion] in the EC, but there is no breakdown of these figures as between products, 
traders and distributors.  Significant research is required before true cost and benefit 
analysis can be made. 
O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 404. 
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to other products of their interest such as coffee, cotton, and rice among 
others in the recent past.  The reason for such attention can be traced 
both to the agricultural policy137 of these countries and to the problem of 
protection of traditional knowledge,138 which is a very sensitive issue for 
a substantial portion of the developing world. 
Given these considerations, it is clear that one should be more 
cautious when approaching the issue of the extension of Article 23 than 
the issue of the multilateral register.  This is because in this case, an 
increase in the level of protection for certain products could possibly 
lead to a reduction in the level of competition in the relevant global 
market and a reduction of consumer choice.139  In the context of the 
multilateral register, instead, the only thing discussed is the method of 
implementation of a given level of protection that already exists in the 
world market and for which the WTO member states have already 
pondered and accepted the related costs and benefits when they entered 
the TRIPs Agreement. Therefore, as explained below, any 
determination about the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement should be undertaken only after a thorough investigation of 
the rationale underlying it.  One must also consider the related trade 
issues in order to develop a better informed policy choice, one that will 
serve the interests of the entire international community, and not just a 
few of its members. 
A.  Why Are GIs Needed in the First Place? 
In order to understand whether Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement 
should be extended to GIs of products other than wines and spirits, it is 
first necessary to define the need served by this particular form of 
identifier, or, in other words, the purpose for its existence.  Part I 
provided a brief description of the historical reasons for the creation of 
GIs, while Part II discussed how the international regime is the result of 
a difficult political compromise.  However, in order to advocate a 
further extension of this regime to new kinds of products, it is necessary 
to conduct a deeper investigation that goes beyond the economic 
interests of the involved parties and leads to a solution that could 
generally be accepted.  To accomplish this goal, it is therefore necessary 
to understand the mixture of protectionism and intent to reduce 
consumers’ excessive research costs that characterizes GIs. 
137. See infra Part III.B.2. 
138. See infra Part III.B.3. 
139. For a discussion of consequent significant trade distortion, see infra Part III.A. 
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GIs have always been treated as a form of IP akin to trademarks, 
and for this reason the same philosophical rationale underlying 
trademarks has often been adopted to justify the protection of these 
geographic terms.  In particular, supporters of GI protection have often 
underlined the need to provide consumers with accurate information 
about the origin of products in order to avoid trade distortion.140  Also, it 
has been noted that in the modern market, in which consumers have 
become increasingly demanding, being able to build consumer 
confidence through accurate information about the origin of the 
products is economically valuable.141
Conversely, those against the protection of GIs reject the argument 
that this “trade distortion” is caused by insufficient or inaccurate 
information.  Rather, they consider GIs to be a form of protectionism 
that works to the exclusive advantage of a few producers in a particular 
region.  Therefore, they also envision a trade distortion problem, but 
they believe this problem is caused by the reduction of the level of 
competition in the international market, that, in absence of GI 
protection, would have been produced by new entrants. 142  Ultimately, 
they argue, a reduction of consumer welfare would result. 
In order to evaluate these opposing arguments, it is first important 
to determine whether indeed there is a trade distortion connected to 
insufficient or inaccurate information being provided to consumers 
regarding the geographic origin of certain products.  For this purpose it 
is possible to underline that when a correlation between the geographic 
place in which the product is produced and its quality is present, the 
information conveyed by GIs is valuable143 to the consumers.  This 
information helps consumers make better-informed decisions and 
consequently reduces the possibility of market failures.144  Ultimately, 
such a system of information would favor the development of a higher 
level of consumer confidence.  It is thus possible to conclude that, if 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87 (where the EU representative’s 
argument about the trade distortion caused by the absence of adequate protection of GIs in 
the international market, which was presented during  negotiations that preceded the TRIPs 
Agreement). 
141. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71. 
142. Tim Josling, Geographical Indications:  Protection for Producers or Consumers 
Information? (unpublished article, (on file with the author). 
143. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71. 
144. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 591 (5th 
ed. 2000) (“Competitive markets fail for four basic reasons:  market power, incomplete 
information, externalities, and public goods.”). 
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there is this connection, the absence of protection of GIs creates trade 
distortion in the international market. 
The problem, however, is to determine how much information is 
necessary145 to increase consumer welfare in the way described above 
without incurring too many related costs.  In the case of GI protection, 
this would consist mainly of reduced competition in the relevant 
market.146  In other words, it is important to provide just enough 
information to create consumer welfare without having to sacrifice too 
much competition.  This also benefits consumers.  Indeed, when the 
costs of providing the information outweighs the benefit that the 
consumer can get from it, the consumer suffers because the amount of 
information received does not compensate for the reduction of 
competition in the market.  In this situation, there is overprotection of 
GIs, as the only subjects who benefit from it are the local producers.147  
This results in a trade distortion.  Instead, when the costs of providing 
the information do not outweigh the benefit provided to the consumer, 
and the consumer is willing to pay for that information, GIs are under-
protected;148 thus, there is a market failure.149  The “benefit in this case 
goes to the producer of the product that would not have been purchased 
if adequate information were provided”150 with consequent trade 
distortion. 
Applying this analysis to the international protection of GIs under 
the TRIPs Agreement evidences the challenge of determining the right 
level of information and the right level of protection required for 
producing optimal consumer welfare.  This is because consumers around 
the world have different needs for information about different products.  
However, this determination is at the same time essential for the 
development of international trade, as uniform standards help to reduce 
145. Josling, supra note 142. 
146. Indeed, another significant cost is represented by the fact that those consumers 
that consider certain geographic names as generic terms might be misled by an increase of 
protection that would include such terms.  An example could be represented by the use of the 
term “champagne,” which for some consumers represents a certain kind of sparkling wine 
and not a particular wine coming from a specific geographic region of France.  Indeed, as 
discussed below, see infra Part IV, the level of protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement should not extend to generic terms.  See also on this point the discussion of the 
Australian delegate during the negotiations that preceded the TRIPs agreement.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 72-75. 
147. Josling, supra note 142. 
148. Id. 
149. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 144, at 592. 
150. Id. 
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transaction costs and uncertainty in the global market.  In these regards, 
it can thus be noted that a level of protection that goes beyond the 
“misleading test” of Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement, such as the one 
that is provided by Article 23, is difficult to justify under the analysis 
above.151
This conclusion can also be explained through the concept of 
consumer utility or well-being, which may be defined as a function of a 
combination of a certain amount of information and a certain amount of 
competition within this context.  After a certain point, the utility of 
obtaining additional information at the expense of competition 
decreases, as does consumer satisfaction.  In other words, there is a 
point after which consumers do not know what to do with more 
information—as they already know everything they need in order to 
make their purchases—but they do not mind more competition—and 
thus having more choices.  The same reasoning applies if instead there is 
too much competition and not enough information.  In this case, 
consumers lose confidence and thus are less satisfied.152  While the 
enactment of Article 22 certainly reduces competition, it also increases 
the information available to the point of allowing consumers to make 
the purchases they want, which results in a higher level of utility.  
However, additional information beyond Article 22 is not essential for 
customers’ decisions and, at the same time, causes a decrease in 
competition; therefore, the utility decreases. 
It is therefore possible to say that if the level of information 
provided beyond Article 22 is not economically justifiable, a different 
rationale for the extension of Article 23 to products other than wine and 
spirits might be required.  Indeed, as has been suggested by Josling, “in 
a world where trade in different products is expanding and producer 
incomes from satisfying consumer desire for quality and variety are 
replacing subsidies from government assisting the market in meeting 
such demand is both wise and economically defensive.”153
If this is true in the case of GIs, then it suggests that even though 
consumer welfare is not increased by additional information about the 
origin of the products beyond a certain level, it is increased by the 
151. More precisely, it is difficult to understand how, at that point, consumer 
satisfaction is enhanced by adding additional units of information that are not needed to 
avoid market failure.  See infra Figure 1. 
152. Id. 
153. Josling, supra note 142.  Indeed, significant in these regards are the international 
negotiations on the agriculture that are characterized by a progressive elimination of trade 
barriers such as tariffs and quotas. 
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ability of these identifiers to satisfy the consumers’ demand for a certain 
quality and variety.  This, in turn, suggests that consumer demand is 
indeed the focal point.  The quality of the product, which is not intended 
as a particular standard, but as a distinctive character of the product, 
becomes the most important element and measure for the protection of 
GIs.  If this perspective is indeed adopted, the extension of Article 23 is 
then warranted only when the connection between the quality of the 
product and its place of origin is irreplaceable elsewhere,154 such as in 
the case of wine.155  The additional rent that producers derive from such 
an extension is then used as an incentive to keep producers close to the 
territory and investing in the maintenance of the desired quality.156
This conclusion, linking protection of GIs to further investments in 
the quality of products, seems to be reinforced by what has happened to 
the wine industry in the last decade.  During this period wine producers 
have shifted their focus towards quality.  In the 1990s, consumers’ and 
producers’ interest focused on “premium” wines as revealed by the 
increase in consumption of high-priced wines and the production of 
high-priced grapes.157  During the same time, wine exports of those 
countries that are not considered traditional158 wine producers 
(Argentina, Australia, Chile, South Africa and United States) have 
expanded significantly and are still expanding. 159  Therefore, it is 
possible to say that today the wine industry is much more competitive 
than in the past and that apparently the introduction of Article 23 of the 
TRIPs Agreement did not present an obstacle for such a development 
154. In absence of this exclusive connection, other means of protection for the quality 
of the products could be envisioned, such as in the case of certificate mark—certificate marks 
only say that products have a certain quality, not that this quality is due to its place of origin 
which is instead what GIs do. 
155. As explained below in Part III.C, this is because of the application of the concept 
of terroir that identifies the elements that make wine unique.  See infra Part III.C. 
156. In this regard, the remarks made by the EU delegate during the negotiations 
become significant.  See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
157. In the United States, for instance, the consumption of wines above $7 passed from 
9.5 million cases in 1991 to 41.2 million in 2001, whereas the consumption of wines below $7 
passed from 97.3 million to 103.9 million.  The increment of the high-priced wine was 673% 
versus the 6% of the “jug” wine.  Dale Heiein & Philip Martin, California Wine Industry 
Enters New Era, CAL. AGRIC., July-Sep. 2003, at 72, available at http://californiaagriculture. 
ucop.edu/0303JAS/pdfs/wine.pdf. 
158. The countries that are considered the traditional wine producers are Italy, France 
and Spain because of their history with the product, and because in the last fifty years they 
have had a share of the entire world market between fifty  and sixty percent.  Id. at 74. 
159. For example the average yearly increase rate of wine exports from the countries 
listed above is twelve percent.  2004 Crop:  Quality Excellent, Yields Down, THE CRUSH, Oct. 
2004, Volume 31, Issue 10; Heiein & Martin, supra note 157, at 74. 
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in this market. 160  This is because the fundamental element that has 
characterized the market for wine is the demand for quality and not the 
amount of information available to consumers in that market.  This 
conclusion can be explained once again with the consumer utility that, in 
this context, can be understood as a combination of a certain amount of 
quality and a certain amount of competition.161
Finally, it is possible to infer that an extension of Article 23 to 
products other than wine and spirits could cause the same result, or, in 
other words, could create a much more competitive market in quality 
goods.  As explained below, the validity of this extension would become 
at this point an empirical issue that must be verified case-by-case for 
each category of products.  This verification depends on the products’ 
intrinsic characteristics and their relationship with the territory in which 
they are produced. 162
B.  The Debate about the Extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement 
There is a substantial academic debate on the extension of Article 23 
to GIs on products other than wines and spirits.  Presented below are 
the most significant arguments that have been used to support the 
various viewpoints of the debate. 
1.  GIs as Generic Terms 
The most recurrent argument used to explain the reluctance of the 
United States and other countries to extend the level of protection of 
Article 23 and their opposition to the EU’s initiative to regain the 
exclusive use of certain GIs names is related to the characterization of 
terms.163  Many terms that qualify as GIs in the EU and other countries 
are considered generic names in the United States, or, in other words, 
common descriptive names for certain types of goods.164
160. The exact impact of the introduction of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement on the 
development of the wine market in the last decade is difficult to assess.  Indeed, the only 
possible observation on this point consists in the fact that notwithstanding the adoption of 
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement, the wine market developed in the way described in the 
text and that therefore the introduction of the higher level of protection for GIs on wine and 
spirits seems not to have had a negative impact on the market or seems to have been 
counterbalanced by some other factor such as the strong consumer demand for higher quality 
and variety.  See Heiein & Martin, supra note 157. 
161. See infra Figure 2. 
162. Does the product, whose GI protection is considered, have those qualities that can 
be derived exclusively from its place of origin as indicated by the GI itself? 
163. See infra Part IV. 
164. As described above, the “sort” of generic terms in relation to the international 
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In particular, one commentator noted that: “American consumers 
are blissfully ignorant of the way in which [Appellation of Controlled 
Origin] (AOCs) and other [GIs] express complex linkages between the 
territorial origin of food products and the human contribution to their 
refinement.”165  In other words, American consumers do not perceive 
that GIs indicate that the product comes from a particular region of the 
world and that its qualities are due, among other things, to this factor.  
Also, according to this author, there is no evidence that American 
consumers value this information when making a purchase choice.  He 
also underlines the fact that generic or semi-generic terms coupled with 
a term designating their actual origin are common and perfectly 
acceptable locutions in the American language. 
This argument does not seem to be as accurate as the 
aforementioned commentator states, in part due to the awareness of the 
average American consumer.  Indeed, it is true that many consumers in 
the United States are unaware of the full significance of GIs, 
particularly on products coming from a different country, but this 
conclusion certainly cannot be generalized.  A more specific explanation 
on this point is required. 
As noted by another commentator, “[t]he point in determining 
whether the—’generic’—argument is applicable depends on the relevant 
market with which we are dealing.”166  In other words, we cannot judge 
the behavior of American consumers without defining a priori which 
“segment” of consumers is interested in the product in consideration.  
Indeed, if this analysis is based on the relevant market for the specific 
product, the behavior and knowledge of the American consumer is not 
much different from the behavior and knowledge of the European 
one.167  For a mere issue of proximity, European consumers are more 
familiar with European GIs and their significance, but a substantial 
portion of Europeans (as part of the local relevant market) have also 
begun to recognize American and Australian wines, among other 
protection of GIs is indeed not a new issue and it has been a source of conflict among the 
delegates since the very beginning of the negotiations for the TRIPs Agreement.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 72-79. 
165. Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellation of Origin:  How the United States 
will Crash France’s Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 60 (1996). 
166. Philippe Zylberg, Geographical Indications v. Trademarks:  The Lisbon 
Agreement:  A Violation of TRIPs?, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 62 (2003). 
167. Id. at 61.  In both cases the issue of whether a specific term is a generic one or not, 
becomes an empirical question to be verified in each of the relevant markets involved by the 
GI in consideration and not in the market at large. 
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products, and to identify them by their origin and quality.  The same can 
be said for the relevant segment of American consumers in relation to 
other domestic and foreign products.168
Also, it should be kept in mind that because GIs are normally 
related to very high quality products169 and not to mass-distribution 
products, we should define the relevant market based on this 
information.  Also, it should be considered that, particularly in the 
“western developed world,” the standard of living and the level of 
education have significantly risen in the last decade, and thus, an 
increasing number of consumers make more sophisticated purchasing 
decisions.170
Moreover, today’s consumers, “[f]aced with the on-going 
transformation in the agri-food industry weakening the products’ land-
based association and with problems such as the ‘mad cow’ disease,” 171 
have found new purchasing criteria and have become more demanding. 
Consumers are guided more and more often in their purchase decisions 
by health and environmental concerns.  Indeed, there is a growing 
consumer interest in “environmentally sound and socially responsible 
quality products”172 and thus an increased awareness of their origin and 
quality.  In this context, GIs are becoming extremely powerful and 
valuable marketing tools, and consumers from all over the world are 
becoming aware of their significance. 
In conclusion, in today’s world GIs add value to products because 
they meet the demand of an increasing number of consumers173 by 
identifying products of high quality whose valuable characteristics are 
due to their origin.  Thus, they deserve to be protected against the risk, 
168. Id. 
169. Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement limits the use of GIs to high-quality products.  
However, given the way in which GIs developed in the EU, it can be said that historically 
they have been normally associated with products possessing some special qualities that were 
believed to derive from their place of origin.  As explained above, in order to preserve this 
goodwill, and given the collective ownership of GIs (in those countries that have a sui generis 
GIs law), producers in many countries have created associations that have the function of 
fixing standards of quality and monitoring their observance by all the producers who wish to 
use the area where they are located.  Id. at 25. 
170. Zylberg, supra note 166, at 17. 
171. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 874. 
172. Id. 
173. However, it should be noted that some other consumers could be confused by the 
protection of GIs, particularly when the terms in consideration have become generic in 
certain countries.  Indeed, as explained below in Part IV, the protection of GIs should not 
include generic terms. 
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on one side, of becoming generic names174 and, on the other, of being 
“captured” by free-riders.  As noted by a commentator, “the only issue 
is determining which names should be protected175 and how to deal with 
the problem of the abuse of those names by those who are not 
entitled.”176
2.  Consumer Protection and Agricultural Policy 
Another significant argument presented against the extension of the 
higher level of protection provided by Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to products other than wines and spirits and the EU’s 
initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain GIs is that GIs are 
“designed primarily to maximize producer incomes and only 
secondarily, if at all, to protect consumer expectations.”177  Moreover, it 
has also been noted that by extending the scope of Article 23, a number 
of products will have to be relabeled, and thus, there is a substantial risk 
of increasing consumer confusion.  Therefore, according to one 
commentator, it is not quite clear if consumers will materially benefit 
from an extension of protection of Article 23 to all goods.178  He has also 
underscored that, in the end: 
 
[i]f a product label uses a geographical term in its name that is 
not the true origin of the product, while clearly and 
simultaneously informing the consumer of the product’s true 
origin elsewhere on the label, [the] so-informed consumer[] can 
reject the product as not ‘authentic.’  Ultimately, consumer 
purchasing power may provide the impetus to producers to cease 
using the geographical term in the product’s name.179
 
In response to these comments, one author has noted that GIs “seek 
to guarantee the accuracy of information to the consumer.”180  He 
174. For those terms that are already generic, see infra Part IV. 
175. Both in relation to the requirements for being a GI and to the determination to 
those GIs that at this point indeed acquired the status of generic name; see infra Part IV for a 
brief discussion about generic terms and pre-existing cases. 
176. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 56.  Indeed, it should be pointed out that “the issue 
is not so clear on the practical side.  There are a number of practical examples of conflicts 
which underline the debate on GIs.”  Id.  One of the most famous examples is the use of the 
word “Budweiser” and “Budvar” for beer. 
177. Chen, supra note 165, at 62. 
178. Bowers, supra note 63, at 155. 
179. Id. at 158. 
180. Zylberg, supra note 166, at 61. 
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explains that, “the segmentation of the market [resulting from an 
increased protection] should not be considered a monopoly but a way of 
ensuring product conformity to a list of product requirements that 
consumers expect.”181  Moreover, according to this commentator, 
protecting GIs “fosters at least a higher level of consumer protection 
against deception182 than any other intellectual property right (such as, 
for example, trademarks).”183  Therefore, the primary goal of GIs is to 
protect consumers from confusion, and not to expose them to such a 
risk as other commentators suggest. 
Other commentators have also noted that, with the extension of 
Article 23, “products illegitimately using [GIs] may well be relabel[]ed, 
but this [will] only [happen] . . . where the same product category is 
concerned and where these products do not qualify for one of the 
exceptions provided for in Article 24.”184  According to them, “[i]t 
seems, . . . to be a rather daring argument to maintain that consumers 
might be confused by correct label[]ing and use of GIs.”185
Yet, commentators who oppose the extension of Article 23 are not 
convinced of the benefits that consumers will gain from the extension.  
These commentators argue that the GI system proposed by the EU is a 
measure of agricultural policy and not a law aimed at consumer 
protection.  In particular, according to one author, GIs “lie at the heart 
of an elaborate scheme to secure exclusive production rights and a 
desirable return on incumbent farmers’ entrepreneurship.”186
The issue of agricultural policy is closely related to the controversy 
regarding the GIs,187 and therefore, it is worth spending a few words to 
explain the underlying problem.  Is the regulation of GIs a measure of 
agricultural policy?  It certainly is!  As noted by one commentator, a 
legitimate system of registered GIs . . . requires proof and preservation 
of a real connection with a geographic area, and arguably also 
observance of product standards . . . .  [A] system that imposes [such] 
181. Id. 
182. In these regards, it is important to keep in mind that GIs, intended as identifiers 
that increase consumers’ welfare by providing useful information, can perform this function 
only when the consumers in the relevant market do not already associate them with some 
other meaning other than the geographic place from where the product originated. 
183. Id. 
184. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 890.  See also infra Part IV (briefly discussing 
the issue of generic terms and pre-existing cases).  Of particular significance in this regard is 
the exception known as the grandfather clause.  TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4). 
185. Id. 
186. Chen, supra note 167, at 62.  See also supra Part III.A; note 154. 
187. Id. at 62-64. 
 2008]   REGULATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION  243 
 
 
strict controls on agricultural production is quite clearly an instrument 
of agricultural policy.”188
The next question is therefore automatic: who will benefit from this 
regulation?  The answer depends on the industrial and agricultural 
context.  “As a general rule, the potential economic benefits of 
registered GIs are most apparent where established industries in rural 
areas adhere to traditional methods and established crop choices, have 
maintained geographic integrity and have an established reputation.”189  
It is therefore clear that the EU and the developing countries 
supporting the extension of the protection of GIs are those that, for 
historical and economic reasons, will benefit the most from this 
regulation.  The increased level of protection will also yield other 
benefits for them such as rural goodwill, maintenance of rural 
employment, the creation of added value for foodstuffs, and limiting of 
overproduction.190
Nevertheless, it is fair to underscore that, although to a certain 
extent the aforementioned effects of a system of protection of GIs are 
well-accepted policy goals, the extension of the scope of protection of 
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement might not necessarily be the best 
way to achieve them in every country.  Indeed, in countries in which 
general policy settings reflect that the structure of rural industry 
fluctuates over time, crop choice decisions are unsettled, and innovation 
and flexibility are established tools of rural policy, “[i]t will be more 
effective to rely on corporate branding strategies, as well as combating 
consumer deception as to origin by way of actions against 
misrepresentation, and/or reliance on collective or certifications 
marks.”191
3.  Developing Countries and the Issue of Traditional Knowledge. 
The existing relationship between the international regulation of GIs 
and the agricultural policy of different countries illustrates why in the 
last couple of years a number of developing countries, such as India, 
188. W. Van Caenegem, Registered GIs:  Intellectual Property, Agricultural Policy and 
International Trade, 26(4) E.I.P.R. 170, 175 (2004). 
189. Id. 
190. The limitation of overproduction to a certain extent might be inconsistent with 
some of the GATT principles supporting agriculture.  A full discussion of this point goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is worth mentioning that some commentators 
have noticed how GIs are becoming a “substitute” for those measures of agriculture policy 
that are not permissible an more.  Josling, supra note 143. 
191. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176. 
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Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Egypt, 
Mexico, Perù and Cuba have demonstrated significant interest in this 
kind of intellectual property.192  Several commentators have pointed out 
that because of the intrinsic characteristics of GIs and the specific 
agricultural policy of some developing countries based on small-scale 
and traditional methods of rural production, an extension of the scope 
of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement will benefit the economies of 
those countries by providing competitive advantages to their products 
on the international market.193  Today, many developing countries are 
demanding higher protection for GIs without distinction between wines 
and spirits and other products for this reason.  Indeed, as one 
commentator has pointed out with specific reference to African 
countries, “[b]y fostering traditional products and names . . . , by adding 
value to food production, and by giving international name recognition 
to a community, [GIs] can play a minor but nevertheless important role 
in bolstering the rural areas where the majority of people live.”194
However, the enhanced international protection of GIs does not 
come for free.  As several commentators have noted, it will require the 
establishment, at least at the state level, of an expensive system of 
policing195 that enhances protection to all products and of quality-
control in order to guarantee the consistent quality that is the most 
important element of the entire system.  Many developing countries will 
have to invest a significant amount of resources to meet the 
requirements of the GI system of registration and protection, and for 
some of them the costs might ultimately be unbearable.  Moreover, the 
benefits of GI protection will not be immediate and will require a long-
term investment because the traditional products of these countries will 
have to first build their reputation on the international market before 
becoming truly competitive and thus producing the desired results.  In 
other words, the enhanced protection of GIs will require developing 
countries to undertake a significant financial effort for a benefit, which, 
although substantial and potentially achievable, will arrive sometime in 
the distant future. 
On the other hand, what choice do they have?  As one commentator 
notes, “[a] number of developing countries have, in their 
192. Marsha A. Echols, Geographical Indications for Food, TRIPs and the Doha 
Development Agenda, 47 J. AFR. L., 199, 211-12 (2003). 
193. See id. 
194. Id. at 200. 
195. Van Caenegem, supra note 188. 
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communication to the TRIPs Council, identified [GIs] as a category of 
intellectual property right from which they might profit.  This is 
probably more than can be said for the other categories of intellectual 
property rights, which they are obliged to implement.”196  As for the 
costs, the author very cynically underscores that “[i]t is arguable how 
much of a greater burden this would impose in addition to the European 
wine and spirits indications, which developing countries are already 
obliged to protect under Article 23.1.”197   
Moreover, 
 
the necessity for developing countries to implement the 
multifarious obligations in the TRIPs Agreement . . . involved 
very considerable burdens.  These major implementation costs 
were imposed upon developing countries without any suggestion 
of the necessity to undertake financial or economic impact 
studies.  Against this, the costs of extending Article 23.1 are 
arguably negligible.198
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the request of developing countries 
should be given substantial weight in the consideration of expanding the 
protection of GIs as this represents for them one of few serious 
opportunities for economic development.  Nevertheless, developed 
countries, and the EU in particular, should not use this factor as an alibi 
to achieve their own goals.  They should provide the required assistance 
and guidance to those countries that decide to invest in the development 
of their own GIs. 
Developing countries have also put forth the initiative of using GIs 
to protect traditional knowledge (TK).  While a full discussion of this 
issue goes far beyond the scope of this paper,199 it is worth some 
explanation.  There is currently no universally accepted definition of 
TK.  “Most international organizations and scholars define TK, in fairly 
broad terms, as a diverse range of tradition-based innovations and 
196. Blakeney, supra note 1, at 650. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 645-50. 
199. This represents a very synthetic analysis of the issue of the protection of TK.  As 
explained in the text, some commentators have suggested protecting TK through GIs; 
however, it has to be understood that this would be only a partial solution for TK owners as 
they also ask for a more patent like protection.  Unfortunately, a full discussion of this point 
goes far beyond the scope of this paper. 
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creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, 
literary, or artistic fields.”200
Although TK is recognized as a culturally and economically 
important area of intellectual activity, it does not receive the benefit of 
intellectual property protection. 
 
Problems arise . . . because TK . . . is not the kind of intellectual 
activity that western IP law anticipates protecting.  [The result is] 
that developing countries and [non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)] observe . . . the ‘taking’ of genetic resources and 
biodiversity, developed by TK in local communities, [to be used] 
in support of research and development (R&D) efforts for 
industries in the developed world.  [The d]eveloped countries 
and their constituents think of such activit[y] as legitimate R&D, 
while developing countries and supporting NGOs call these 
instances of “biopiracy.”201
 
Currently the TRIPs system does not explicitly protect TK, and thus, 
TK holders, in order to assert their rights, have to operate in each and 
every country on a case-by-case basis.  This situation represents an 
obvious disadvantage particularly for those people who come from a 
developing country and thus have limited resources.  As noted by some 
commentators, a solution to this problem could be represented by the 
international protection of TK through the extension of the scope of 
Article 23.  “TK emerges from the customs, practices and needs of a 
particular people or territory, . . . [and has] as much direct connection 
as, if not more than, wines and spirits to the region in which they 
originate.”202  GIs also, because of the lack of private ownership that 
characterize them, represent a particularly suitable form of IP 
protection for TK that has as one of its most notable factors, the 
communal sense of origin.  According to this author, the costs of 
extending the scope of Article 23 are offset by the benefit represented 
by the preservation of TK.  “TK and its products . . . have economic 
value to the local communit[y] in which they develop,” and GIs make 
sure that such value stays where originated.203
200. Sumathi Subbiah, Reaping What They Sow:  The Basmati Rice Controversy and 
Strategies for Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529, 531 
(2004). 
201. Id. at 530. 
202. Id. at 548. 
203. Id. at 559. 
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4.  Preservation of Culture 
Another argument presented in support of extending the scope of 
Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement is the cultural one.  As noted by one 
commentator, “[b]y inserting a section for the protection of [GIs] in 
TRIPs, traditionally made foods were saved, or rather, the threat of the 
McDonaldization of those traditionally and culturally impregnated 
goods were weakened.”204  Therefore, according to this argument, a high 
level of protection of GIs would promote diversity205 and, by conveying 
the cultural identity of a nation, region, or locality, would add a human 
dimension to the goods.206  The export of such goods would then enable 
countries to better understand the culture of other countries. 
However, it is important to underscore that, although the 
aforementioned effects are certainly desirable, it is very difficult to 
directly trace these effects to a high level of protection of GIs, and 
therefore, more evidence establishing this link should be provided in 
order to come to these conclusions. 
5.  Costs of GI System 
One commentator has pointed out that 
 
[t]here is little doubt that the setting up of a domestic register of 
GIs is an expensive undertaking . . . .  [For instance], a legitimate 
GI registration system should ensure consistent product 
standards and a close geographical connection.  This requires a 
complex determination of specifications and enforcement.  
[Therefore, t]he advantage, if any, gained by having a system of 
registered GIs is countered by the financial cost of the system, 
borne by agricultural producers but also by taxpayers at large.207
 
In response to this consideration, some other commentators have 
noted that 
 
[e]xtending the scope of protection for products other than wines 
and spirits does not entitle the setting up of any new mechanism 
or scheme of protection . . . .  In fact, the existing scope of 
protection for GIs for wines and spirits required by the TRIPs 
204. Zylberg, supra note 166, at 61. 
205. Id. 
206. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 874. 
207. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176. 
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Agreement already today would be simply extended to GIs for 
other products.  Therefore, the same protection system or 
mechanism chosen by a Member in order to implement Article 
23 could also be used to grant the extended product coverage 
protection.208
 
Also, with regard to the financial side of a GI system, it has been 
noted that “[l]ike other forms of intellectual property, registered GIs do 
not constitute their own reward.  Investment is required to build their 
reputation, by way of protection, promotion and advertising . . . .  
Building goodwill is obviously expensive but also takes time.”209  
Nevertheless, this point does not seem to be very convincing because, if 
the alternative to the use of GIs for producers is to seek protection 
through the trademark system, or some other form of certification mark, 
then the same kind of investment in time and financial resources would 
be required for this latter option, making the argument self-
eliminating.210
6.  Imbalance Between Countries with Regard to Existing GIs 
A number of WTO countries have a long tradition in GI protection 
and have, therefore, developed many more GIs over time than those 
present in other countries, which have just started to make use of and 
benefit from this kind of intellectual property.  For this reason, 
countries opposing the extension of protection of GIs argue that the 
countries with current GI systems will enjoy a much higher benefit in 
the short run from such an extension than those countries that are only 
recently starting to develop GIs.211  In response to this point, some 
commentators have noted that, “it is important to recognize that it is not 
the number of GIs per country that should be taken into consideration 
when assessing the merit of a better GI protection, but rather the 
economic potential of each well-protected GI.”212
Although it can certainly be said that these authors have a point, the 
former argument does not seem to be satisfactory, as some countries213 
208. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 887. 
209. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 176.  See also supra Part II.B.3. 
210. Indeed, the same author also seems to admit this point when he says “like other 
forms of intellectual property . . . .”  Van Caenegem, supra note 189, at 176. 
211. See Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 887. 
212. Id. at 889. 
213. Particularly the developing countries.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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might not yet be in a position to be competitive in a market with a few 
strong GIs. 
C.  Practical Perspective About the Extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs 
Agreement 
As discussed above, the most important element to determine the 
legitimacy of extending Article 23 to GIs on products other than wines 
and spirits is the connection between the quality and uniqueness of the 
product and its place of origin.  This connection must be exclusive to the 
point that the desired quality of the product in consideration must be 
impossible to replicate in any other place.  The described relationship is 
present in the case of wine, but it seems reasonable to infer that this 
characteristic is not limited to wine.  Additionally, there might be many 
other products that present similar or even stronger connections with 
their place of origin.  If this is true, disparity of treatment problems 
emerge among producers of wine and producers of similar products. 
Indeed, as noted by some commentators, at the moment producers 
of goods other than wines and spirits are in a much more onerous 
position compared to the producers of products covered by Article 23.214  
This is because, for instance, if the producers want to receive the 
protection of Article 22, they must prove the illegitimate use of the 
particular GI.  This process consists of a use that misleads the public or 
constitutes unfair competition.215  On the other hand, the producers of 
wines and spirits with registered GIs will not have to provide such proof 
and thus will enjoy a higher uniformity of treatment in every WTO 
country.216  Indeed, the level of determination of the domestic courts is 
much higher in the case of the existence of the elements required for the 
finding of illegitimate use than in the case of ownership of a GI for wine, 
and thus, it is plausible to conclude that different courts in different 
countries (or even within the same country) can more easily reach 
different decisions for similar situations in the case of Article 22 than in 
the case of Article 23.  Therefore, an extended system of protection for 
GIs that would include all eligible products will have the benefit of 
eliminating such a disparity of treatment among producers of similar 
products. 
In Part III.A, it has also been pointed out that the eligibility of the 
products subject to the extension of Article 23 level of protection is an 
214. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 882. 
215. Id. at 881. 
216. Id. at 882. 
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empirical question that requires a case-by-case analysis of existence of 
the specific “quality” of the product due to the territory in which it is 
produced.  To better illustrate this point, a brief description of the 
empirical analysis that would be required for this purpose follows 
below. 
The first step consists of determining the relationship between the 
qualities of wine and its place of origin.  This is necessary because, as 
discussed above, wine possesses the kind of “quality” required for the 
level of protection provided by Article 23 under TRIPs.  Thus, the 
analysis of this product can facilitate the selection of the cases in which 
this level of protection should be extended to other products.  In other 
words, it is necessary to determine in the first place what made wine so 
special to determine the scope of Article 23. 
 
The belief that the soil in a particular vineyard imparts a 
distinctive character to the resulting wine is strong in Europe, but 
less so in the New World. . . . 
. . . 
[Where it is believed that] [w]ith skilled wine-making techniques, 
it should be possible to make quality wine from disease-free, 
mature fruit of any desirable variety.217
 
Nevertheless, studies have shown that “the distinctive character of 
[the] wine will depend on the terroir (soil218 and climate)”219 and that 
“[e]xamples exist of a significant influence of soil on wine character for 
particular grape varieties grown in St.Emilion Pomerol, the Médoc, the 
Côte d’Or, Beaujolais, Napa Valley, and the Coonawarra Region.”220  
Therefore, it appears essential to develop a better understanding of the 
217. ROBERT E. WHITE, SOIL FOR FINE WINES 223, 249 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
218. Id. 
The scientific and technical understanding of the influence of the soil in terroir is not as well 
advanced as that of climate, grape variety, and cultural methods. . . . [S]oil is so variable in the 
landscape . . . that quantitative relationship between soil properties and the yield and 
composition of grapes will only be elucidated on a local scale (a few hectares in area).  This is 
consistent with the empirical evidence of the [French Apellation d’Origine Contrôllée] system 
[(which identifies  all the vineyards in particular areas, based on their geographic location, 
and prescribes the acceptable varieties, viticultural methods, yield, fruit ripeness, and 
maximum alcoholic strength of the wine)] especially as it applies to the Grand Crus of 
Burgundy and the First Growths of Bordeaux. 
Id. at 249. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
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precise meaning and significance of the French term terroir for wine 
production.  The word terroir encompasses much more than the “simple 
relationship between soil and wine as many other factors contribute to 
define this concept.”221 Indeed, there exists a wide variety of alternative 
meanings for the word terroir.  This includes: 
 
• Metaphysical concept: in which “the vine make 
known to us the true taste of the earth;”222 
• Factual concept: in which “several factors . . . of the 
natural environment (soil, climate, [and] topography), 
biological (variety [and] rootstock), and human (of 
wine, wine-making, and history)” are combined;223 
• Dynamic concept: in which “permanent factors (e.g., 
geology, soil, [and] environment) and temporary 
factors (variety, cultural methods [and] wine making 
techniques)” are combined.224 
 
For the purpose of the present analysis, the “dynamic concept” of 
terroir seems to be particularly useful as it illustrates which factors in the 
production of wine strictly relate to the place of origin.  This is opposed 
to those other elements that, although very significant for the 
determination of the special character of the end product, are transient 
because of the human component that characterize them.  Indeed, those 
latter elements relate to people225 and not to geographic places, and 
thus, are not relevant in terms of the protection provided by Article 23. 
They can be easily transported by immigrants, and thus, do not possess 
the territorial exclusivity element required by GIs. 
The permanent factors, on the other hand, pertain uniquely to the 
place of origin of the wine and they are not replicable elsewhere.  They 
are subject to changes, but to a much lower degree than the temporary 
221. Id. at 3. 
222. Id. at 3. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. It is worth underscoring that it is possible to argue that “people” are also the 
product of their environment and that, therefore, the kind of contribution provided by them 
would not be possible unless they were part of the particular community where the wine is 
produced.  However, the kind of human contribution that is relevant in this context (and 
consist mainly in “local culture” and “traditional methods”), although widely recognized, is 
very difficult to be quantitatively determined and directly traced to the “quality” of wine, and 
thus for the purpose of the present analysis it should be disregarded.  See id at 249; Addor & 
Grazioly, supra note 61, at 896. 
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factors and over such a long period of time as to become almost 
irrelevant in terms of wine production.  Also, the changes themselves 
pertain exclusively to the specific geographic place, and thus, they 
become not replicable elsewhere. 
It is necessary to analyze a specific example in which the relationship 
between a particular terroir and the characteristics of the wine is 
significant to determine how all of this applies in the context of real 
products.  For this purpose, the wine “Chianti Classico DOCG” (see 
Table 1) has been selected.226  It is possible to notice that in the 
production of Chianti the particular terroir consist of both temporary 
factors such as “growing and making techniques” and permanent factors 
such as “soil, altitude, and climate.”227
At this point it is necessary to compare the terroir of the Chianti with 
the elements of production of another product (or category of products) 
that has a strong relationship with the territory as well.  For this 
purpose, the Olio Extravergine d’Oliva ‘Riviera Ligure—Riviera dei 
Fiori’ DOP (see Table 1) has been selected.  It is possible to also notice 
that temporary factors and permanent factors are involved in the 
production process and that very similar dynamics to the one delineated 
for the wine production can be envisioned in this context.  Also, this 
product has a very defined character228 that makes it unique, and that is 
due, among other things, to elements such as the specific soil and 
climate, which are exclusive to the place of origin and cannot be 
replicated elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226. In the case of Chianti Classico, the unique character is given by the particular 
combination of elements such as “limpidity” (limpid), “color” (lively ruby-red tending to 
garnet with aging), fragrance (vinous with scents of violets and a pronounced character of 
finesse in the aging phase) and “flavor” (harmonious, dry—with a maximum of 4 grams of 
reducing sugars per liter—sapid and lightly tannic).  Chianti Classico, It’s the Land that Makes 
the Difference, How it is Produced:  Chianti Classico 2000, http://www.chianticlassico.com 
[hereinafter ChiantiClassico]. 
227. See WHITE, supra note 217, at 3. 
228. Consisting in the unique combination of elements such as color (golden, pale 
straw-yellow), fragrance (pleasantly fruity) and taste (delicate, tending towards sweet).  See 
ChiantiClassico, supra note 226. 
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 Wine Olive Oil 
Product Name Chianti Classico DOCG Olio Extravergine 
d’Oliva ‘Riviera 
Ligure—Riviera dei 
Fiori’ DOP 
Permanent Factors229
Location of 
plants 
(Vineyards)Chianti Classico 
DOCG region230—Italy 
(Olive-groves) Imperia 
province in Liguria 
region—Italy 
Terrain shape Slopes of hills (forbidden: 
flat terrains) with 
appropriate orientation 
Terraces on medium to 
high slope hills 
Altitude Above 700m. Not specified. 
Soil Sandstone, limestone, marl, 
clayey schist, sand and 
pebbles. 
Well drained 
calcareous soil derived 
from limestone rocks 
of Eocene 
Climate Mediterranean/continental 
climate: humid winter (4-5° 
C), and dry, hot summers 
(30° C) 
Mediterranean climate: 
summer average 
temperature about 27° 
C, winter average 
temperature about 8° 
C 
Variety of the 
plant 
Sangiovese (80%-100%) Taggiasca (90%-100%) 
Temporary Factors 
Growing 
techniques 
Organic fertilization and no 
irrigation. Planting 
densities, training systems 
and systems of pruning 
according to tradition not to 
modify grapes 
characteristics 
According to tradition 
not to compromise 
organoleptic properties 
Harvesting Not specified Directly from plants 
 
229. These factors are derived from the production codes and information pages of the 
corresponding products available at www.chianticlassico.it and http://www.olio-extra-
vergine.it/oliva/sicurezza-e-qualita/olio-dop/Disciplinare-Olio-Dop-Riviera-Ligure/. 
230. According to the definition of the Italian Interministerial Decree of July 31, 1932.  
See also DPR, art. 5 (July 12 1963); DPR, art. 3 (Aug. 9, 1967), DPR, art. 3 (July 2, 1984); 
Law 164, art. 5 (Feb. 10, 1992). 
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Making 
techniques 
“Governo all’uso toscano” Traditional method of 
millstones or hammer 
mills 
Yield of 
product  
Yield of wine from grapes < 
70% 
Yield of oil from olives 
< 25% 
Table 1: Comparison of Chianti Classico DOCG and Olio 
Extravergine d’Oliva ‘Riviera Ligure—Riviera dei Fiori’ DOP 
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that a different treatment of GIs 
for olive oil and GIs for wine under the TRIPs Agreement seems to be 
completely unjustified.  There are no significant differences in terms of 
“quality,” intended as “character of the product” and connection with 
the territory, intended as elements determining the uniqueness of the 
aforementioned “quality,” can be identified.  The very same reasoning 
also seems applicable to other categories of products such as 
marmalade, balsamic vinegar and juice, but significantly different results 
can be reached if wine is compared to products such as cheese and ham 
for which the subsistence of certain permanent factors appears less 
relevant and the temporary factors are more prominent. 
“Chianti Classico DOCG” of the previous example has been 
compared with the Parmiggiano Reggiano cheese (see Table 2).  From 
this analysis it is possible to notice that several of the permanent factors 
that contribute to the uniqueness of the examined wine are missing in 
the case of Parmigiano Reggiano.  Nourishment of dairy cows seems to 
be the determinative element for Parmigiano Reggiano.231  Also, a 
substantially different dynamic of production for the Parmigiano 
Reggiano can be envisioned as compared to the one for wine, and thus, 
the extension of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to cheese appears 
more questionable than in the case of olive oil. 
Although the exact relevance of the previous considerations in the 
determination of the uniqueness and connection with the territory of 
 
231. To be more specific in the comparison between Chianti wine and Parmigiano 
Reggiano cheese, it is worth mentioning the following issues.  First, the grape groves get their 
nourishment directly from a permanent factor, the soil, while dairy cows are fed with forage 
and pellets.  Second, up to twenty-five percent of the cow forage may come from outside the 
region of origin and the origin of the pellets is not even specified.  Third, and most important, 
even if one hundred percent of the forage and the pellets come from the region of origin, 
there is no specification on the other permanent factors (like terrain shape, altitude, soil, and 
climate) for these nourishments.  Enoteca del Gallo nero s.r.l, http://www.chianticlassico.it/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008); Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, http://www.parm 
igiano-reggiano.it/index.html?l=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
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Parmigiano Reggiano cheese as opposed to the uniqueness and 
connection with the territory of wine goes beyond the purpose of this 
paper, the present analysis is useful to reiterate the need of operating 
the extension of Article 23 on a case-by-case basis in which the relevant 
elements that connect the different categories of products to the 
geographic area are identified and used in a determinative way. 
 
 Wine Cheese 
Product Name Chianti Classico DOCG Parmigiano Reggiano 
Permanent Factors232
Region of 
origin 
(Vineyards) Chianti 
Classico DOCG area233 - 
Italy 
Provinces of Parma, 
Reggio-Emilia, 
Modena, Bologna (on 
the left bank of the river 
Reno) and Mantova (on 
the right bank of the 
river Po) 
Terrain shape Slopes of hills (forbidden: 
flat terrains) with 
appropriate orientation 
Not directly applicable 
Altitude Above 700m. Not directly applicable 
Soil Sandstone, limestone, 
marl, clayey schist, sand 
and pebbles. 
Not directly applicable 
Climate Mediterranean/continental 
climate: humid winter (4-
5° C), and dry, hot 
summers (30° C) 
Not directly applicable 
Plant / animal Sangiovese (80%-100%) Dairy cows 
Temporary Factors 
 
232. These factors are derived from the production codes and information pages of the 
corresponding products.  Enoteca del Gallo nero s.r.l, http://www.chianticlassico.it/ (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008); Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, http://www.parm 
igiano-reggiano.it/index.html?l=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
233. According to the definition of the Italian Interministerial Decree of July 31, 1932.  
See also DPR 930, art. 5 (July 12 1963); DPR, art. 3 (Aug. 9, 1967), DPR, art. 3 (July 2, 1984); 
Law 164, art. 5 (Feb. 10, 1992). 
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Growing 
techniques / 
Cattle breeding 
techniques 
Organic fertilization and 
no irrigation. Planting 
densities, training systems 
and systems of pruning 
according to tradition not 
to modify grapes 
characteristics 
Not specified 
Harvesting / 
Cow milking 
Not specified Not specified 
Making 
techniques 
“Governo all’uso toscano” Traditional techniques 
following the standards 
of the consortium 
Yield of 
product  
Yield of wine from grapes 
< 70% 
1 Kg from 16 liters of 
milk 
Table 2: Comparison of Chianti Classico DOCG and Parmigiano 
Reggiano Cheese 
 
IV.  GENERIC TERMS, PRE-EXISTING RIGHTS AND THE EU INITIATIVE 
TO RECLAIM THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF CERTAIN GIS 
The most recent issue in the international negotiations on GIs is the 
legitimacy of the EU initiative to regain the exclusive use of certain GIs 
for the relevant WTO member states, even where they are currently 
considered as “generics” or “trademarks” in other WTO member states.  
The EU proposal was presented for the first time in the context of the 
agricultural negotiations and so far has been strongly opposed to the 
point of jeopardizing even the negotiations over other subjects.234  
Before Cancun, fifteen European countries prepared a list of forty-one 
regional products of very high and recognized quality and with 
“appellations of origin” whose GIs are used all over the world. 235  Some 
examples are Prosciutto di Parma, Prosciutto San Daniele, Parmigiano 
Reggiano, Grana Padano, Pecorino Romano, Mozzarella di Bufala 
Campana, Mortadella di Bologna, as well as Chianti, Grappe di Barolo, 
and Marsala.236
 
234. See supra Part II.B; note 123. 
235. See also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta and Bourbon: The Spirites Debate About 
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006). 
236. Id. 
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A.  The Issue 
The EU initiative discussed here originates mainly from two issues: 
the market access problem237 created by the exceptions included in 
Article 24 and what is considered an historical argument.238  The market 
access problem consists of the fact that 
 
[t]he use of [the] TRIPs exceptions in certain individual cases 
prevent the EU producers to effectively use their GIs in third 
markets . . . .  This may happen either de jure (e.g. when a 
company of country A registers, as a trademark, a GI of country 
B in country A and thus impedes producers of country B to use 
this name in country A, thus forcing country B’s producers to re-
label the product in order to market it) or de facto (e.g. country 
A considers a certain GI of a country B as a “generic” term that 
is freely used for poor-quality products; by the time country B 
starts marketing its genuine GI product, the reputation 
associated with that GI is so eroded that any investment in 
recuperating its image is futile . . . ).239
 
As noted by one commentator, the “historical argument” refers 
instead to the fact that “[GIs] identify real . . . places, and inhabitants 
should not be deprived of their inherent right to use their place names 
in relation to their products.”240  In other words “[t]hey should not 
become victims of their own success . . . under the guise of genericness,” 
or trademark protection.241  Therefore, those supporting this EU 
initiative object to other countries “usurping” their terms.  Conversely, 
those opposing the EU initiative reject the “usurping” accusation 
particularly in situations where immigrants have taken the methods242 of 
making the products and the names with them to their new homes.  
Furthermore, they also generally question a priori the existence of a 
mandate under Doha to negotiate over this issue.  In this regard, many 
commentators have underscored that, “[s]ome countries have a long 
tradition in manufacturing products which were brought by immigrants 
237. Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks—The Road from 
Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 991 (2003). 
238. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 173. 
239. Goebel, supra note 237, at 991.  “An example [is] ‘champagne’ which in many 
countries is perceived as a generic term for sparkling wine.”  Id. 
240. Van Caenegem, supra note 188, at 173. 
241. Id. 
242. See supra text accompanying note 228. 
 258  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [12:2 
 
 
with special knowledge and skills from their old to their new home 
countries and which then were produced under the same geographical 
name as the one used in their country of origin.”243  The issue, therefore, 
is whether in such situations the producers in the “new countries,” 
whose products are labeled with those GIs included in the EU list, 
should still be allowed to use their trademarks. 
B.  Generic Terms and the Issue of Pre-Existing Rights 
Notwithstanding the importance of the arguments advanced on 
behalf of the EU request, such as the need for protection of the cultural 
identity and traditions embedded in the creation of the products 
included in the list, the argument presented against the EU position has 
to be preferred particularly when the contested name has become 
generic in the country where people from Europe immigrated and 
settled.  Indeed, in these countries the protection of GIs that over time 
have become generic244 would cause consumers to be misled245 and thus 
could also cause trade distortion.246
As for the other terms on the EU list that are not yet generic and 
consist instead of trademarks, no exception to the general conclusion 
presented in the previous chapter for the extension of Article 23 of the 
TRIPs Agreement should be granted.  Therefore, the higher protection, 
consisting in the grant of the exclusive use of these terms to those 
producers located in the area defined by the geographic word in 
consideration, should be provided only to those GIs on products that 
can be considered similar to wines and spirits.247
The exception included in Article 24(4) of the TRIPs Agreement has 
to be applied in cases of subsistence of pre-existing rights, which consist 
of trademarks on similar products comprising of those geographic terms 
to which Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement should be extended.248  As 
noted by the same authors, this is not a new problem as the same 
situation happened in the past with wines and spirits.249  Indeed, Article 
24(4) establishes that: 
243. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 889. 
244. O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 43. 
245. Indeed, in this case consumers would not perceive that GIs indicate that the 
product to which they are associated come from a particular region, but would associate them 
to a general set of characteristics that pertain to a particular product. 
246. See supra Part III.A; note 149. 
247. See supra Part III.C. 
248. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4). 
249. See Bowers, supra note 63, at 162. 
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Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to prevent 
continued and similar use of a particular geographical indication 
of another Member identifying wines or spirits in connection 
with goods or services by any of its nationals or domiciliaries who 
have used that geographical indication in a continuous manner 
with regard to the same or related goods or services in the 
territory of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding 
15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that date.250
 
As it can be seen, “when additional protection was negotiated for 
wines and spirits, a favorable solution for ‘immigrants’ was found.”251  In 
that specific case, the problem was solved by the adoption of the 
aforementioned exceptions included in Article 24(4) of the TRIPs 
Agreement that “safeguard[s] the acquired rights of . . . producers of 
wines and spirits, who have had a long tradition in using a particular GI 
not originating from that country in a continuous manner with regard to 
the same or related goods for at least ten years.”252
The logical conclusion is therefore that if an extension of protection 
of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to those terms listed by the EU 
that are not yet generic occurs, the exception included in Article 24 of 
the TRIPs Agreement should be extended as well. 
CONCLUSION 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the negotiations 
surrounding the international regulation of GIs are still open and very 
controversial.  Several political and economic obstacles seem to 
delineate irreconcilable positions among the WTO member states with 
very few negotiable points.  Nevertheless, GIs are valuable economic 
tools and have the potential of providing new opportunities of 
development for those countries that are in great need of economic 
growth.  Therefore, further analysis of this subject is required in order to 
define alternative solutions to the different issues presented in the 
negotiations. 
While the creation of the multilateral register for wines and spirits 
appears to be quite straightforward, the extension of the higher level of 
protection of Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to products other than 
250. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 24(4). 
251. See O’CONNOR, supra note 50, at 50. 
252. Addor & Grazioli, supra note 61, at 890. 
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wines and spirits is a more complicated issue.  In the latter case, the 
specific interests of single WTO Member States should be put aside and 
the solution supported by the stronger economic rationale should be 
preferred. 
Finally, the recent EU initiative of reclaiming the exclusive use of 
certain GIs even where they are currently considered to be generic or 
trademarks in other WTO Member States appears to be nothing more 
than a retaliation for the deadlock of the GIs negotiations that preceded 
and characterized the Cancun meeting.  Indeed, no legitimate basis for 
the grant of a different treatment to the listed GIs can be found. 
In conclusion, it is important to underscore the significance of 
preserving the integrity of certain products that in many cases represent 
the result of centuries of human development, the effort to achieve the 
desired result, and the strict relationship with the territory of origin.  
Indeed, the uniqueness of these products provides the main justification 
for the protection of their GIs. 
APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1 
The graph shown in this figure represents the passage from Article 
22 to Article 23 in terms of information, competition, and utility to 
consumers.  At market equilibrium, the information of Article 22 (I1) 
and the corresponding competition (C1) are represented by point A1 on 
the indifference utility curve u1.  If the protection is extended to Article 
23, the market will settle in a different point of equilibrium represented 
by A2, which is the combination of a certain amount of information (I2) 
and competition (C2) on the indifference utility curve u2.  An increase in 
information beyond Article 22 is less useful to consumers because after 
that point the consumer is not misled, that is, the consumer has enough 
information to make the desired purchase.  Therefore, the utility 
corresponding to the information provided by Article 23 has to be lower 
(u2 < u1).  At the same time, the reduction in competition is much higher 
in this case than in the situation in which A1 moves to A3 and the utility 
is constant.  Indeed, in this case A1 moves to A2 on a lower utility curve 
and C1 moves to C2 and not C3. 
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FIGURE 2 
A possible explanation of the development of the wine market in the 
last decade is reported here. The graph shown in this figure represents 
the passage from A1 to A2 in terms of quality, competition, and utility to 
consumers.  A1 and A2 are the market equilibrium points with level of 
quality, Q1 and Q2, and levels of competition, C1 and C2.  As the quality 
increased from Q1 to Q2, A1 moved to A2 and not, for example, to A3, 
which, assuming constant utility, would have determined a decrease of 
competition from C1 to C3.  This is because the consumer demand for 
more quality has been so strong to put an increase in quality on a higher 
utility curve u2 (u2 > u1).  In fact, C1 moved to C2 as seems to be testified 
by the expansion of wine exports of the countries that are not 
traditionally considered wine producers. 
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